Transcript
qa-wl8_wpZA • Serhii Plokhy: History of Ukraine, Russia, Soviet Union, KGB, Nazis & War | Lex Fridman Podcast #415
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Kind: captions Language: en what happened during World War II was that once the Germans started to run out of of Manpower they created Foreign Legion groups but because those people were not Arians they couldn't be trusted so they were put under the command of Henry himler under command of ss and became known as assess Waffen units and uh one of such units was created in Ukraine the following is a conversation with Siri ploi a historian at Harvard University and the director of the Ukrainian Research Institute also at Harvard as a historian he specializes in the history of Eastern Europe with an emphasis on Ukraine he wrote a lot of great books on Ukraine and Russia the Soviet Union on Slavic peoples in general across centuries on Chernobyl and nuclear dister disasters and on the current war in Ukraine a book titled the rousa Ukrainian War The Return of History this is the Le stre podcast to support it please check out our sponsors in the description and now dear friends here's sirii what are the major explanations for the collapse of the Soviet Union maybe ones you agree with and ones you disagree with very often people confuse three different processes that were taken place in the late 80s and early 90s and the one was the collapse of Communism as ideology another was the end of the Cold War and the third one was the end of the Soviet Union uh all of these processes were interrelated interconnected but when people provide ideology as the explanation for all of these processes that's why I disagree because ideological collapse happened on the territory of the Soviet Union in general the Soviet Union lost the Cold War whether we are talking about Moscow Leningrad or St Petersburg now ofas St but the fall of the Soviet Union is about a story in which Vaso and St Petersburg ended up in one country and K of me andan ended in different countries so the theories and EXP explanations about how did that happen for me this are really very helpful theories for understanding the Soviet collapse so the mobilization from below the collapse of the center against the background of economic collapse against the background of ideological uh ideological implosion that's that's how I look at the at the fall of the Soviet Union and that's how I look at the theories that explain that collapse so it's a story of geography ideology economics which are the most important to understand of what made the collapse of the Soviet Union happen the Soviet collapse was unique but not more unique than collapse of any other Empire so what we really witnessed or the the world witnessed back in 1991 and we continue to witness today with the Russian aggression against Ukraine is a collapse of one of the largest world Empires we talk about talked about the Soviet Union and now talk about Russia as possessing plus minus one six of the surface of the Earth you don't get in possession of one six of the Earth by being a nation state you get that sort of size as an Empire and the Soviet collapses continuation of the disintegration of the Russian Empire that started back in 1917 that was arrested for some period of time by the Bolsheviks by the communist ideology which which was internationalist ideology and then came back in full force in the late 80s and early 90s so the most important story for me this is the story of the continuing collapse of the Russian Empire and the rise of uh not just local nationalism but also rise of Russian nationalism that turned out to be as a destructive force for the Imperial or multi- multiethnic multinational State as was Ukrainian nationalism or Georgian or or Estonian for that matter oh you said a lot of interesting stuff there in 1917 Bolsheviks internationalists how that plays with the idea of Russian Empire and so on but first let me ask about us influence on this so so one of the ideas is that you know through the cold war that mechanism us had major interest to weaken the Soviet Union and therefore it the collapse could be attributed to pressure manipulation from the United States is there truth to that the pressure from the United States this is part of the Cold War and Cold War part of that story but it's it it doesn't it doesn't explain the Soviet collapse and uh the reason is quite simple the United States of America didn't want the Soviet Union to collapse and disintegrate they didn't want that at the start of the Cold War in 1948 we now have the Strategic documents they were concerned about that they didn't want to do that and certainly they didn't want to do that in the year 19991 as late as August of 1991 the day of C the the month of the K in Moscow President Bush George HW Bush travels from Moscow to C and gives famous or INF famous speech called chicken cave speech basically warning ukrainians against going for Independence the Soviet collapse was a huge headache for the administration in the white house for a number of reasons they liked to work with gorbachov the Soviet Union was emerging as a junior partner of the United States on the international Arena collapse was destroying all of that and on the top of that there was a question of the nuclear weapons unaccounted nuclear weapons so the United States was doing everything humanly possible to keep the Soviet Union together in one piece until really late November of 1991 when it became clear that it was it was a loss cause and they had had to say goodbye to to gorbachov and to the project that he he introduced uh a few months later or year later there was a presidential campaign and Bush was running for the second term and was looking for for achievements and there were many achievements I I I basically treat him with great respect uh but destruction of destruction of the Soviet Union was not one of those achievements he was on the on the other side of the of that divide but the the the the politics the political campaign of course have their own rules and they produce and give birth to mythology with which we we still at least in this country we live till now till today so gorbachov is an interesting figure in all of this is there possible a history where the Soviet Union did not collapse and some of the ideas a gorbachov had for the future of the Soviet Union came to life of course history on the one hand there is a statement it it doesn't allow for what ifs on the other hand in my opinion history is full of what if that's what history is about and certainly certainly there there are scenarios how the Soviet Union would would uh continue uh would continue beyond let's say gorbachov's tenure mhm and the argument has been made that the reforms that he introduced that they were mismanaged and they could be managed differently or there could be no reforms and there could be continuing stagnation so that is all possible what I think would happen one way or another is the Soviet collapse in a different form on on somebody else's watch at some later period in time because we we dealing with not just processes that were happening in the Soviet Union we're dealing with global processes and the 20th century turned out to be the century of the disintegration of the empires you look at the globe at the map of the world in 1914 and you compare it to to the map at the end of the 20th century in 1991 1992 and suddenly you realize that there are many candidates for being the most important event the most important process in the 20th century but the biggest the biggest Global thing that happened was redrawing the map of the world world and producing dozens if not hundreds of new States that's the outcome of the different processes of the 20th century look Yugoslavia is falling apart around the same time Czechoslovakia goes through what can be called a civilized divorce a very very rare occurrence in in the fall of multi- multinational States so yeah the writing was on the wall whether it would happen under gorbach of or later whether it would happen as the result of reforms or as the result of no reforms but I I I I think that sooner or later that's that that would happen yeah it's very possible hundreds of years from now the way the 20th century is written about as the century defined by the collapse of Empires you call the Soviet Union the last empire the book is called the last empire so is there something fundamental about the way the world is that means it's not conducive to the formation of Empires the meaning that I was putting in the term the Soviet Union as the last empire was that that was the Soviet collapse was the collapse of the last major European Empires traditional Empires that was there in the 18th century 19th century and through most of the 20th century uh the the Austria Hungary died uh in in the midst of World War I the Ottoman Empire disintegrated the Brits were gone and and left India and there was the the the successor to the Russian Empire called the Soviet Union was still hanging hanging on there and then came 1991 and what we see even with today's Russia it's it's a very different it's a very different sort of policies the the uh Russia uh or Russian leadership tried to learn a lesson from 1991 so there is no National republics uh in the in the Russian Federation that would have more rights than uh the the Russian administrative units uh so that the structure is different the uh nationality policies are different the the level of russification is much higher so it is it is in many ways already a post po Imperial formation and you're right about the that moment 1991 the role that Ukraine played in that seems to be a very critical role he describe just that what role Ukraine played in the collapse of the Soviet Union history is many things but it started uh in a very simple way of making notes about on the yearly basis what happened this year at that so it's about chronology chronology in the history of the collapse of the Soviet Union is very important you have Ukrainian referendum on December 1st 1991 and you have dissolution of the Soviet Union by the leaders of Russia Ukraine and Belarus one week later MH and the question is why uh Ukrainian referendum is is the answer but ukrainians didn't didn't answer their referendum question whether they want the Soviet Union to be dissolved or not they answered very limited in terms of uh it's it's it's been in question whether you support the decision of vov Nar of your Parliament for Ukraine to go independent and the rest was not was not on the ballot so why then one week later the Soviet Union is gone and uh president yelson explained to President Bush around that time the reason why why Ukraine was so important he said that well if Ukraine is gone Russia is not interested in this Soviet project because Russia would be outnumbered and outvoted by the Muslim republics so there was there was a cultural element but there was also another one Ukraine happened to be the second largest Soviet Republic and then post-soviet state in terms of population in terms of the economy economic potential and so on and so forth and as yelon suggested Clos culturally linguistically and otherwise to Russia so with the second uh largest Republic gone Russia didn't think that it was in Russia's interest to continue with with the Soviet Union and around that time yor gar who was a chief economic advisor of yelson was telling him well we just don't have money anymore to support other republics we have to focus on Russia we have to use oil and gas money within the Russian Federation so the the state was bankrupt uh Imperial projects at least in the context of the late 20th century they costed money it it wasn't a money-making machine as it was back in the 18 or 19th century and uh um the combination of all these factors led to the to the processes in which Ukraine's decision to go independent spelled the end to the Soviet Union and if today anybody wants to restore not the Soviet Union but some form of Russian control over the post-soviet space Ukraine is as important today as it was back in December of 1991 let me ask you about Vladimir Putin's statement that the collapse of the Soviet Union is one of the great tragedies of History to what degree does he have a point to what degree is wrong his formulation was that this is the greatest the greatest geopolitical catastrophe or tragedy of the 20th century and I specifically went and looked at the text and and put it in in specific time when it was happening and it was interesting that the statement was made a few weeks before the uh May 9 parade and and celebrations of the of the uh Victory a key part part of of the mythology of the current of the current Russian state so why say things about the U Soviet collapse being the the largest geopolitical strategy and not in that particular context the Second World War uh my explanation at least is that the World War II the price was enormous but the Soviet Union emerged as a great Victor and captured half of Europe 199 one the the the in terms of the of the lives lost at that point the price was was actually very very low but for Putin what was important that the state was lost and he in particular was concerned about the division of the Russian of the Russian people which he understood back then like he understands now in a very very broad terms so for him for him the biggest tragedy is not the loss of life the biggest strategy is the loss of the great power status or or the unity of Those whom he considered to be Russian Russian Nation so at least this is my reading this is my understanding of what what what what is there what is on on on the paper and what is between the lines so both the unity of the sort of quote Russian Empire and the status of the superpower that's how I read it you wrote a book the origins of the Slavic Nations so let's go back into history what is the origin of uh Slavic Nations we can look at that at that from different perspectives and we are now making uh major breakthroughs in in answering this question with the uh very interesting Innovative linguistic analysis the study of DNA so that's that's that's really the New Frontier we are getting into uh prehistorical period where there is no historical sources and from what we can understand today and that can of course change tomorrow with all these breakthroughs um in in Sciences is that the the slaves came into existence somewhere in the area of um marshes prepet marshes Northwestern part of Ukraine uh southwestern part of Belarus eastern part of Poland and and that's is considered to be a historical homeland of slaves and then and then they spread and they spread all the way to the Adriatic so we have croats we have Russians spreading all the way to the Pacific we have ukrainians we have Bellar Russians poles once we had czechoslovaks now we have we have Czechs and slovaks so that's the story of starting with the eth and 9th century we can even a little bit earlier we can already follow that story with the help of of the of the written sources mostly from Byzantine then then then later from Western from Western Europe but what uh I was trying to do not being a scientist not being an expert in in linguistics or not being an expert in in in DNA analysis I was trying to see what was happening in the minds of those peoples and the Elites in particular whom we call today not slaves but Eastern slaves which means Russians ukrainians and B Russians how they imagin themselves how they imagin their world and eventually I look at the so-called nation building projects so trying to answer the question of how we arrived uh to the situation in which we are today where there are not just three East Slavic Nations but there are also three East Slavic States Uh Russian Ukrainian and belarussian so this is this is the focus of my of my book I end admittedly in that particular book I end on the 18th century before the era of nationalism but then there are other books like lost lost kingdom that where I I bring the story all the way up to today so what aspect of the 8th and 9th century uh the East Slavic states perier to to today that we should understand well the the most important one is that the existence of the state of caveen Roush back during the medieval period created a foundations uh for historical mythology common historical mythology and there are just Wars and battles over who has the right more right for kaven Rus uh the legal code that was created at that time existed for a long period of time the acceptance of Christianity from Byzantium that became a big issue that separated then Eastern slaves from their Western neighbors including checks and and and and and poles but uh United in that way to let's say bulgarians or serbs and uh the beginning of the written literature uh beginning beginning in C so all of that is uh considered to be part of Heritage all of that is being contested uh and uh this this debates that were academic for a long period of time what we see now tragically are being being continued on the on the battlefield what is K what is Roose that you mentioned what's the importance of these you mentioned them as the sort of defining places and uh terms labels at the beginning of all this so what is KV uh K uh became a capital uh of or the The Outpost of the Vikings who were try trying to establish control over the um trade route between um what what is today's uh Western Russia and and and bellus and Northern Ukraine so the forest areas and the biggest and the richest Market in the world that existed at that time which was in Constantinople in Byzantium so the idea it was the idea was to get whatever Goods you can get in that part of Eastern Europe and most of those goods were slaves local population put them on the ships uh in cave because cave was on the border with the step zones stab zones were controlled by other PE other groups uh cians oratian pans Pags and so on and you you name it and then staying on the on the river being protected from attacks of the nads to come to the Black Sea and and sell this products in Constantinople that was that was the idea that was the model uh Vikings Vikings tried to practice that sort of of of uh um business model also in other parts of Europe and like in other parts of Europe they turned out to be by by default creators of new politic of new state and that was that was the story of the first of the first caveen dynasty and Cave as the capital of that huge Empire that was going from the baltics to today's Central Ukraine and then was trying to get through the southern Ukraine to to the Black Sea that was a major major European State Kingdom if you if you want to call it of medieval Europe with a lot creating a lot of tradition in terms of Dynasty in terms of language in terms of religion in terms of again historical mythology so cave is central for uh for the uh Nation nation building myth of a number a number of groups in the region so in one perspective and narrative Kev is at the center of this Russian Empire at which point does Moscow become come to prominence as the center of the Russian Empire but the Russian Empire is a term and really creation of the 18th century uh what we what we have for the Caven we call it caveen rose again this is a term of the 19th century they call themselves Rus R and there was Metropolitan of Rus and there was Rous principalities so very important important to keep in mind that Rus is not Russia because that was a selfname for all multiple groups on that on that territory and U Moscow doesn't exist at the time when cave emerges as as the capital uh the first the first reference to Moscow comes from the 12th century when it was founded by one of the Caven one of the Caven princes and Moscow comes to prominence really in a very different context and with a very different Empire running the show in the region the story of Moscow and the rise of Moscow this is the story of the Mongol rule over over former Ru lands and former R territories um the the part of the former R eventually overthrows the the Mongol control with the help of the small group of people called lithuanians which which had a yan yan State and Yan Dynasty and and United this lands which were mostly in today's terms Ukrainian and belarussian so they separate early and what is today is Russia mostly Western Russia Central Russia stays under the Mongol control up until late 15th century and that was the story when Moscow Moscow Rises as the new capital of that real replacing the city of Vladimir uh as as that Capital uh for those who ever went to Russia they they familiar with the with of course Vladimir as the place of the oldest uh uh architectural monuments uh the so-called the golden reain of Russia and so on and so forth lir is Central and there was so many architectural monuments there because before there was Moscow there was Vladimir eventually in this in this struggle over over control of the territory struggle for favors uh from from the Mongols and and the TT horde Moscow emerges as as the center of that particular real under Mongols after the Mongol rule is uh removed Moscow embarks on the project that historians Russian historians of the 19th century called the Gathering of the Russian lands uh using Russian now for Rus and and and and trying to to uh bring back the the the lands of of former cave and Rus but also the lands of the former Mongol Empire uh the Russians get to the uh Pacific before they get to Cave uh historically uh and really the the the quote unquote Gathering of the uh uh quote unquote Russian lands ends only in 1945 when uh the Soviet Union uh bullies the czechoslovak government into turning what is today's trans carpatian Ukraine to the Soviet Union it is included in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic so that's that's the moment when that Destiny the way how it was imagined by the 19th century Russian historian was eventually fulfilled Moscow was in control of all this l so to what degree are the Slavic people one people and this is a theme that will continue throughout I think versus a collection of multiple peoples whether we're talking about the Kevan Roose or we're talking about the 19th century Russian Empire conception well a number of ways to look at that one the most obvious the most clear is language and um there is no question that um polls speak a separate language and their slaves and there is no question for anyone um going to Ukraine and hear in Ukrainian realizing that this is not Russian the level of comprehension can be different you can understand certain words and you you you don't understand others and the same would be with with Polish and the same would be with Czech so there is this linguistic uh linguistic uh history that is in common but languages very clearly indicate that you're deal you're dealing with different with different peoples um uh we we know that language is not everything Americans speak a particular way of English Australians speak a particular variant of English uh but for reasons of geography history we we pretty much believe that despite linguistic Unity these are different nations and different peoples and and there are there are some parts of political tradition are in common others others are quite different so the same when it comes to language the same when it comes to political tradition to the loyalty to the political institution applies to Slavic uh Nations so that's that's again there is nothing particular unique about the slaves in that regard you wrote the book The KAC myth history and nationhood in the Age of Empires it tells the story of an an anonymous manuscript called the history of the Roose it started being circulated in 1820s I I would love it if you can tell the story of this um this is supposedly one of the most impactful texts in history modern history so what's the importance of this text what did it contain how did it Define the future of the region in the first first decads of the 19th century after Napoleonic Wars a mysterious text emerged that was attributed to a Orthodox Archbishop that was La dead which was claiming that the kazaks of Ukraine were in fact the uh original Rus people and that they they uh had the right for a particular place for central place in in the Russian Empire and it tells the history of the kxs full it's it's the year of Romanticism full of all sorts of drama there are heroes there are villains and the text captivates the attention of uh some key figures in the in the Russian intellectual Elite in St Petersburg um um people uh like Krav who was was executed for his participation in 1825 Uprising uh rights rights poetry on the basis of this text Pushkin pays attention to it as well and then comes along the the key figure in Ukrainian national um uh Revival of the uh 19th century Ukrainian national project Tas shenko and and reads it as well and they all read them it very differently uh eventually by the by the beginning of the uh and mid 20th century some of the Russian um mostly nationalist writers call this text the Quran of Ukrainian nationalism so what is what is there the story it's it's it's very important in a sense that what the authors and that's what I claim in the book what the authors of the text were trying to say they were trying to say that the kazak elite should have the same rights as the Russian nobility and brings the long historical record to prove how cool the kaks were over the period of time but in at the beginning of the 19th century they put this claim already they use new new arguments and this arguments are about nation and Nation ISM and they're saying that the kaks are a separate nation and that's that's a big big big claim uh the Russian Empire and this is a very very good argument uh in historiography that Russian empire grew and acquired this one six of the Earth by using one very specific way of integrating those lands it integrated Elites it was making deals with the elites whether the elites were Muslim or the elites were Roman Catholic as the case with the polls they would be Elites would be integrated and the empire was B based on that estate uh uh the estate loyalty and the state integration but once you bring in the factor of nation and nationalism and language then once in a sudden the whole model of the integration of the elites irrespective of their language religion and culture starts falling apart and the polls were the first who really uh produced produced this this sort of a challenge to the Russian Empire by apprising two Uprising in the 19th century and ukrainians Then followed in their uh footsteps so the text the importance of the text is that it was making claim on on the part of a particular estate the kazak officer class which was that Empire could survive but it turned it given the conditions of the time into the claim for the special role h of uh KX as a nation creating that this is a separate nation a r Ru nation and that is the challenge of nationalism that no Empire really survived and and the Russian EMP was not an exception so that's a turning point when the discourse switches from loyalty based on the integration of the elites to the Loyalty based on attachment to your nation to your language and to your culture and to your history so that was like the initial spark the flame that led to nationalist movements that was the beginning and the beginning that was building a bridge between the existence of of the kazak state in the 17th and 18th century that was used as a foundation for the kak mythology Ukrainian national mythology went into the Ukrainian national anthem and the new age and the new stage where the kaks were not there anymore where there were professors intellectuals students members of the of the uh uh National and and organizations and it started of course with romantic poetry it was started with collecting folklore and then later goes to the to the political stage and eventually the stage of mass politics so to you even throughout the 20th century under Stalin there was always a force within Ukraine that wants it to be independent there were five attempts uh for Ukraine to declare its independence and to to maintain it in the in the 20th century only one succeeded in in 1991 but there were four four different attempts attempts before and you see the Ukrainian uh national identity manifesting itself in two different in two different ways in the form of national communism uh after after the bolik victory u in the in uh bolik controlled Ukraine and in the form of radical nationalism in the parts of Ukraine that were controlled by Poland U and and Romania and part of that was also controlled by Czechoslovakia and later Hungary so in those parts outside of the of the Soviet Union the the form of the national mobilization the key form of national mobilization became radical nationalism in in um Soviet Ukraine it was National communism that came back in the 1960s and 1970s and then in the 1991 the the the majority of the members of the Ukrainian Parliament who voted for independence of members of the Communist party so that that Spirit on on on certain level never died so there's National communism and radical nationalism well let me ask you about the radical nationalism because that is a topic that comes up in the discussion of the war in Ukraine today uh can you tell me about stepan Bandera who was he this controversial fire right Ukrainian revolutionary there were at least two stepan Banderas one is the real person and another is mythology that really comes comes with this name and uh the real person was um young student nationalistically oriented student in the late 1920s and early 1930s in the part of Ukraine that was controlled by Poland who belonged to the generation who regretted that they were not born in time for the big struggles of the of the um World War I and and Revolution at that time they believed that their fathers lost opportunity for Ukraine to become independent and that uh a new ideology was needed and that ideology was uh radical nationalism and new tactics were needed so Bandera becomes the leader of the uh organization of Ukrainian nationalists in Ukraine at the young age and organizes a number of assassinations of the Polish officials or members of the Ukrainian Community who this young people in their 17 18 19 considered to be to be collaborators he is arrested put on trial and that's that's where the myth of Pandera starts starts to emerge because he uses the trial to uh make statement about about the um Ukrainian nationalism radical nationalism and its goals and suddenly becomes becomes a hero among the and the youth Ukrainian youth at that time he is uh sentenced for uh for uh execution for death so when delivers his speech he he knows that he he probably would would die soon and then it was the sentence was commuted to life to to life in prison then World War I happens the Polish state collapses under the the pressure coming of course from from Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union uh Bandera walks walks away and presides over the act of the split of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists into two groups the most radical one you used call revolutionary they call themselves revolutionary is led by by Banda they worked together with the Nazi Germany at that time with the hope that Nazi Germany would deliver them independent Ukraine uh first days of the German attack Nazi attack on the Soviet Union the um units formed on the basis of organization of Ukrainian nationalist March into the city of L and declare Ukrainian Independence that was not sanctioned by the German authorities that was not in German plans so they arrest bandara members of his family his brothers me members of the leaders leaders of the organization so his two brothers go to aitz di there he was sent to zon Housen for most duration of the of the war until 1944 refusing to revoke Declaration of Ukrainian Independence which again contributes contributes further to his mythology after the war he never comes back to Ukraine he lives in Exile in Munich uh so between 1930 and his death uh in 1959 he spent in Ukraine maybe up to 2 years maybe a little bit more but most of the time was either in the Polish prison or in the in the German concentration camp or in Exile but the myth of Bandera lived and all the members of the organization of Ukrainian Nationalist and then the Ukrainian Insurgent Army that fought against the Soviets all the way into the early 1950s they were called Bandai they were called band rides by the Soviet authorities they were known also in that way to the local population so there was a far away leader that barely was there on the on the spot but who who whose name was attached to this to this movement for really liberation of Ukraine at that time again the battle that failed the fact that he collaborated with the Nazis sticks for one perspective he's considered by man to be a hero of Ukraine for fighting for the independence of Ukraine from another perspective uh coupled with the fact that there's this radical revolutionary extremist flavor to the way he sees the world that label just stays that he's a fascist he's a Nazi uh to what degree is it's true to what degree is it not uh this label is certainly promoted by the first by the Soviet propaganda and then by Russia prop Russian propaganda it's it's it works very nicely um if you if you focus on the on the years of collaboration uh those were the same years when Joseph Stalin collaborated with Hitler right so we we have we have the same the same reason to call um Stalin Stalin Nazi collaborator as we have uh the reason to call bandara Nazi collaborator we we look at the at the situation in the Pacific in Indonesia in other places uh the leaders who worked together with Japanese with the idea of promoting independence of their countries after the Japanese collapse be become leaders of the Empire so the difference with Bandera is that he never becomes the leader the leader of Empire and and and Immunity that comes with that with that position certainly doesn't apply to him but there are other part parts of his life which certainly certainly put this whole thing in in question the fate of his family his own time in the German concentration camp uh certainly Don't Fit Don't Fit the the propaganda one one-sided image of Bandera in terms of him being a hero that's that's a very very interesting question because he is perceived in Ukraine today by not by by by all and probably not by the majority but by many people in Ukraine as a symbol of fighting against against the the Soviet Union and by extension against Russia and Russian occupation so his popularity grew after February 24th 2022 as a symbol of that resistance again we are talking here about myth and mythology because Bandera was not leading the fight against the Soviet U the the the Soviet occupation in uh in Ukraine because at that time he was just simply not in Ukraine he was in Germany and you can imagine that geography mattered at that time much more than it matters today uh there's a million questions to ask here I think it's an important topic because it is at the center of the claimed reason that the war continues in Ukraine so I would like to explore that from from different angles but just to clarify was there a moment where Bandera chose Nazi Germany over the Red Army When The War already began so in the list of uh allegiances is Ukraine's Independence more important than fighting Nazi Germany essentially the Ukrainian Independence was the their goal and they were there to to work with anybody who would who would support and and in one way or at least allow the Ukrainian Independence so the there is no question that uh they they are just classic nationalists so the the goal is uh nationalism is the principle According to which the at least one definitions is According to which the cultural boundaries coincide with political boundaries so their goal was to create political boundaries that would coincide with the geographic boundaries in the conditions of the World War II and certainly making making deals with with whoever would would uh would either support as I said or tolerate that that project of theirs so I would love to find the line between nationalism even extreme nationalism and Fascism and Nazism so for bander the myth and B the person to what degree let's look at some of the ideology of naism to which degree did he hate Jews was he anti-semitic uh we uh know that basically in his Circle there were people who were anti-semites in a sense that okay we have the texts right we know that we don't have that that information about about or that that sort of tax or that sort of evidence with regard to to Bandera himself um in terms of fascist there is very clear and there is research done that in particular Italian fascist fascism had influence uh on the on the thinking of people in that organization including people at the top but it is also very important to um keep in mind that they call themselves nationalists and revolutionaries and despite the fact that in 1939 in 1940 1941 it was very beneficial for them to declare themselves to be Ukrainian fascists and establish this bond with not just with with Italy but with uh uh Nazi Germany they refused to do that and then they refused to recall their independence so uh influences yes but but clearly it's it's it's it's a different it's it's a type of a political uh political project so let me fast forward into the future and see to which degree the myth permeates uh does Ukraine have a Neo-Nazi problem my understanding is there are Nazis in Ukraine and uh there are there are supporters of uh um white supremacy theories uh but also my understanding is that um they are extremely marginal and they're more marginal than the same sort of groups are in Central Europe maybe in the US as well and for me the question is not whether the Ukraine has it but why even in the conditions of the war the radical nationalism and extremism and and and white supremacist is such a marginal Force when in the countries that are not at the war this is this you look you look at France you look at again it's not exactly Nazism but really right radical right is is becoming so important um why why Ukraine in the conditions of the war is the country that manages relations between different ethnic groups and languages uh in the way that strengthens political Nation so for me as a scholar and a researcher what I see is that uh in Ukraine the the influence of the far right in different in different variations is much lower than it is among among some of Ukraine's neighbors and in Europe in general and the question is why I I don't know I have I I I I don't know answer but that's that's that that's the question that I think is interesting to answer how how Ukraine ended up to be the only country in the world outside of Israel who has a Jewish president who is my at least understanding is the the most popular president in history in terms of how long his popularity goes after the election so this this the the really from my my point of view interesting interesting questions and again we we can we can certainly debate that so uh just for context the the the most popular far right party won 2.15% of the vote in 2019 this is before the war so that's where things stood it's unclear where they stand now it'd be an interesting question whether it escalated and how much what you're saying is that war in general can serve as a catalyst for expansion of extremist groups of extremist nationalistic groups especially like the far right and it's interesting to see to what degree they have or have not risen to power in the sort of in the shadows so no nationalist or nationalistic party actually crossed the the barrier to get into the parliament so Ukraine is the country where there is no right of far right in the parliament we can't say that about Germany we can't say that about France so that's that's just uh um one more way to to to stress this unique unique place of Ukraine in that in that sense and the year 2019 is the year already of the war the war started in 2014 with the annexation of the Crimea the the the front line was near donbas all these groups were fighting there so Ukraine maybe not to a degree that it is now was already on the on the war footing and yet and yet the the the the the right party couldn't couldn't get more than 2% so that's that's the question that I have in mind and yes the war historically historically of course puts forward and and makes from uh uh the the more nationalist views and forces turn them from marginal forces into more Central ones we talked about bandara and we talked about organization of Ukrainian nationalists they were the most marginal group in the political Spectrum in Ukraine in uh the 1930s that one can only imagine but World War II comes and they become the most Central group because they also were from the start go they knew that they had the organization the the the violence was basically one of their means they knew how to fight so historically historically Wars indeed produce those results so we we are looking at Ukraine we we are trying to see what is happening there so Vladimir Putin in his interview with talker Carlson but many times before said that the current goal for the war in Ukraine is densification that the purpose of the war is densification can you explain this concept of densification as Putin sees it densification is the trop that is accepted quite well by the by the former Soviet population and Russian population in particular the the most powerful mythology Soviet mythology that then was basically passed as as part of Heritage to the to the Russian Federation was World War II was fighting against fascism so once you use terms Fascism and Nazi and nazification suddenly suddenly people not just start listening they just stop analyzing and as a as a propaganda tool this is this is of course Very very powerful tool um in terms of to what degree this is this this is the real goal or not we discussed the the importance of the far right in in in Europe and and in Ukraine so if that's the real goal of the war probably the war would have to start not against Ukraine but probably against France or some other country if you take this at face failure well there's something really interesting here as you mentioned I spoken to a lot of people in Russia and uh you said analysis stops in the west people look at the word denotification and look at the things we've just discussed and kind of almost think this this is absurd when you talk to people in Russia maybe it's deep in there somewhere the history of World War II still reverberates through the maybe the fears uh maybe the pride whatever the Deep emotion uh history is there it seems that the goal of denazification appears to be reasonable for people in Russia they don't seem to see the absurdity or the complexity or the even the need for analysis I guess in this kind of statement word of gasification uh I would say this is broader this is broader um the the war that started under the banner that Russians and ukrainians were one and the same people and produces that sort of casualty uh really goes against also some any sort of logical of logical thinking but the uh Russia is a place where the Free Press doesn't exist already for a long period of time Russia is the place where there is U an aamber to degree and as War started first in 2014 and then all out war in 2022 I came across a lot of people on the personal level but also in the media reporting that they really can't find common language with their close relatives in in Russia people who visited Ukraine who know that it is not taken over by by nationalists and is not taken over by Nazism uh but the the media around them the neighbors around them the people at their work basically say one and the same thing and we as humans in general what whatever our background we are very very uh our mind is is really it's relatively easy to manipulate it and uh um to a degree that even even family connections and even Family Ties don't sometimes help to to to maintain that that uh ability to to think and and to analyze on your own to look at at the facts so Putin has alluded to the yurav Hanka incident in the Canadian Parliament September 2023 this man is a uh veteran of World War II on the Ukrainian side and he got two standing ovations in the Canadian Parliament but they later found out that he was part of the SS so can you explain on this what are your thoughts on this this had a very big effect on the narrative I guess propagated throughout the region yes uh What uh what happened during World War II was that uh once the Germans started to run out of uh of Manpower uh they created uh sort of Foreign Legion groups but because those people were not Arians um they they were created for fighting on the on the on the Battleground because they were not Arians they couldn't be trusted so they were put under the command of Henry himler under command of ss and became known as assess Waffen units and uh one of such units was created in Ukraine with great difficulties because Nazis didn't consider Slavs to be generally worthy of even even that sort of Foreign Legion formations uh but they made an exception because those people were coming from galtia which was part of Austria Hungary which means part of Austria which means somehow were open to the benevolent influence of the of the Germanic of the Germanic race and called called the the division giten or galtia uh part of of Ukrainian youth join the gal the division the one of the explanations was that they were looking at the experience of World War I and uh seeing that the units the Ukrainian units in the Austrian Army then played a very important role in the fight for independence so that is one of the explanations you can't just use one explanation to to to describe motivations of everyone and every single person who who was joining there so they were sent to the front they were defeated within a few few short days by the uh by the by the Red Army and then were were uh retreating through through Slovakia where they were used to fight with the partisan movement there and eventually surrendered to the British so that's that's the story you can personally maybe understand what what what the the good motiv ations were of this person or that person but uh that is one of the at the best one of the very tragic and and unfortunate pages in in in in Ukrainian history you you can't you can't justify that as as as as as a phenomenon so from that point of view the the um celebration of that experience as opposed to looking at that okay that that happened and we wish that th those young men who were idealistic or joined the division for idealistic purposes had had had better understanding of things or made other choices but you can't you can't certainly certainly celebrate that and and once that happened that of course became a big a big propaganda propaganda item in in in in the current War uh we are talking about about 10 to 20,000 people in the division and we are talking about 2 to 3 million ukrainians fighting in the Red Army and again it's it's not like Red Army is is is is is completely blameless in the way how it behaved in in Prussia or in Germany and so on and so forth but it's basically it's it's again we are going back to the story of bandara so there is a period of collaboration and that's that's what propaganda tries to Define him by or there is a division giten by 20 th000 people and somehow it makes irrelevant the experience of two to three million people I mean just to clarify I think there is just a blunder on the Canadian Parliament side the Canadian side of not doing research of maybe correct me if I'm wrong but from my understanding they were just doing stupid shallow political stuff let's applaud you know when zalinsky shows up let's have a Ukrainian veteran let's applaud a veteran a World War too and then all of a sudden you realize well there's actually complexities to Wars we can talk about for example a lot of dark aspects on all sides of World War II the mass rape at the end of World War II by the the Red Army when they say martial German there's a lot of really dark complexity and on all sides so you know that could be an opportunity to explore the dark complexity that some of the ukrainians were in the SS uh or Bandera the the complexities there but I think they were doing not a complex thing they were doing a very shallow applaud and we should applaud Veterans of course but in that case they were doing it for show for zilinski and so on so we should clarify that the Applause wasn't knowing it wasn't for the S it was for a Ukrainian it was for World War II veterans but the propaganda or at least uh an interpretation from the Russian side from whatever side is that they were applauding the full person standing before them which wasn't just a Ukrainian veteran but Ukrainian veteran that fought for the SS I don't have any particular insights but I would be very much surprised if even one person in the parliament I mean the members of the parliament actually knew the whole story I would be very surprised yeah the whole story of this person and frankly the whole story of um Ukraine and Russia in World War II period yes yes uh nevertheless it had a lot of power and really reverberated in support of the narrative that there is a Neo-Nazi a Nazi problem in Ukraine this is the The Narrative that is out there um and it's it's especially powerful in Russia it's especially powerful in Russia given that there are um really the the the the uh [Music] the the atmosphere that that has created really is not conducive to any to any independent analysis well I wonder what is the most effective way to respond to that particular claim because there could be a discussion about nationalism and extreme nationalism and the fight for independence and whether it isn't like Putin wrote One people but the question of are there Nazis in Ukraine seems to be a question that could be uh analyzed rigorously with data that has being done on the academic level but uh in terms of the of the public response and public discourse uh the the only response that I see is uh not to focus on the on the questions raised and and put by the propaganda because you already become victim of that propaganda by definition but talk about that much broadly and and talk about about different different aspects of if it is World War II about different aspects of World War II if it's about issue of the far right in Ukraine let's talk about uh us let's talk about Russia let's talk about France let's compare that's the only way how you deal with propaganda because propaganda is not necessarily something that uh is is an outright lie it can be just one factor that taken out of the context and and is is blown out of proportion and that's that is good enough uh in the way to defend against that is to bring in the context let us move gracefully throughout back and forth through history back to Bandera you wrote a book on the KGB spy budon shinski can you tell his story this is a story of the history of the organization of Ukrainian nationalists and and Banda as well already after the end of the second world war MH uh because what you got uh after the second world war so imagine um May of 1945 the red banner is all over Rick Stog the Red Army is in control of half of Europe but the UN of the Red Army are still fighting the war and not just behind the Soviet lines but within the borders of the Soviet Union and this war continues all the way into the early 1950s up to almost up to Stalin's death um the war is conducted by the organization of Ukrainian nationalists which have a Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the government tries to crush that resistance so what it does it basically recruits local people to to spy on the partisans on the Underground and ban stasinski is one of those people his family is supporting the resistance they provide food his his uh sister is engaged with one of the local uh uh commanders of the of this underground unit and uh uh they know everything about Shin's family and they know everything about him because he is also collecting funds for the underground so they have a conversation with him saying that okay that's that's what we got and you and your family can go to to prison or you help us a little bit we we're interested in the fiance of your sister and we want to get him and stasinski says yes and once once they round up the the fiance he basically betrayed a member almost member of his family he's he is done he can't go back to to his village he can't go back to his study he was studying in Vi at that time so he becomes as I write in my book The the secret police becomes his family and he sent to keave he's trained for two years sent to East Germany into Berlin and and becomes becomes an assassin so they sent him across the across the border to to Western Germany to Munich which was the headquarter of different different um organizations anti- Soviet organizations Ukrainian and and Russian and Georgian and so on and so forth and he kills he kills two leaders of the of the organization uh of Ukrainian nationalists one editor of the newspaper and eventually he kills Bandera he does that with the new weapon a spray pistol that eventually makes it into the bond uh novel The Man with the Golden Gun and that whole episode is a little bit reshaped but it is it it is not in the film but it is in the in the novel itself and uh then later has a change of mind under the influence of his German German fiance and then and then wife uh they decide to escape to the West uh and while they're doing that they discover that their apartment was bugged and probably the KB knows all of that so a long story short his son dies in in Berlin uh doesn't allow him to go there but his wife has a nervous breakdown so they allow him to go there to just calm her so that there would be no Scandal and two of them one day before their son's burial because that's after after that they would be sent to Moscow they jump the ship and go to West Berlin 2 hours before the Berlin Wall was being built so they they if they would stay for the funeral probably they would the KB would not let them go but also if they would stay the the the the Border would be there and he goes he goes to the American intelligence and says okay that's that's who I am and that's what I did and they look at him and they say we don't trust you we don't know who you are you have documents in five names you say you killed Banda well we have a different information he was he was uh poisoned and probably by someone in his in his in his close in his Clos Circle a spray pistol did did did you reach to much inan flaming where does this come from he insists they say okay you insist if you committed all those crimes we're given you to the German police and German police will be will be investiga in you and then the trial comes and if he says if he takes back his testimony the whole case against him collapses he can go free but he knows that if he goes free he is a target of his colleagues from from from the same department so his task at the trial is to prove that he is guilty that he's did that and then he disappears nobody knows where he goes and there are all sorts of cover stories and I was lucky to interview a commander for former Chief of the of the South African police who confirmed to me that stasinski was in South Africa he fled the the West German intelligence thought that it was too dangerous for him to stay in Germany they sent him under under a different name to to South Africa so that's uh that's that's the story of stasinski himself but going back to Bandera of course the fact that uh he confessed and it became known that kjb assassinated banda that added to the to the uh um image and and to to General mythology about Banda what a fascinating story of a village boy becoming an assassin who killed one of the most influential revolutionaries of the region in the 20th century uh so what just zooming out broadly on the KGB how powerful was the KGB what role did it play in this whole story of the Soviet Union it depends on the period at the time that we just described late 50s and early 60s they were not powerful at all and uh the reasons for that was that uh people like kusov were really concerned about the secret police becoming too powerful it became too powerful in their mind under Stalin under barrier and it was concerned about the beras power as a secret police chief that led to the CP against ber and U kusov come come into power and Bera was arrested and executed and what what crusha was trying to do after that was trying to put um since 54 the name was already KGB KGB under his control so he was appointed the former comol leaders as the heads of the KGB so the people who really really owned everything to him that that sort of position and the heads of the KGB were not members of poit bur it changed it changed in the 70s with androp where KGB started started to play again very important role in in the Soviet history and um let's say decisions on Afghanistan and the Soviet troops marching into Afghanistan were made by the um apart from Bru by the trio of the people who are not would be called today siliki maybe or not all of them were siki but one of course was on drop of the head of the KGB another was the minister of defense and and then there was secretary in charge of the military industrial complex and Ministry of Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs so but but uh the head of the KGB became really not just the member of poit Bureau but the the the member of that inner circle and then the fact that on drop off succeeds brn is also a manifestation of of the power that KB acquired really after after kof in the in the 1970s and then going into the 19 80s who was more powerful the KGB or the CIA during the Soviet Union the CIA it's a it's uh uh the organization that uh is charged with the uh um information gathering and all sorts of operations including assassinations in in the 50s and 60s abroad the KGB was the organization that really had both the surveillance of over the population within the Soviet Union and and and also the the operations abroad and its members its leaders were members of the Inner Circle for for making decisions I again from what I understand about the way how how politics and decision work and decisions are made in in the United States the the CIA the chief of the CIA is not is not one of the the decision- making group The the providing information yes so so I would say it's not day and night but their power political influence political significance very different is it understood how big the KGB was how widespread it was given its secretive and distributed nature certain things we know others we don't because the Stasi archives are open and and uh most of the KGB especially in Moscow they're not uh but we know that uh the KGB combined not only the uh internal sort of a secret police functions at home and counter uh Counter Intelligence branch and uh intelligence Branch abroad but also the the Border troops for example right so really institutionally it was it was it was a huge huge Mammoth and another thing that we know we can sort of EXT rolate from what we know from the stazzy from the stazi archives that the surveillance at home the surveillance was really massive the guess is the the the the Soviets were not as as effective and as as meticulous and as scrupulous and as methodical as probably as Germans were but that that gives you that that gives you a basic idea of how how penetrated the entire Society was what do you think is important to understand about the KGB if we want to also understand Vladimir Putin since he was a KGB foreign intelligence officer for 16 years from my research including on on the on the stasinski what what I understand is that um in KGB and it was a powerful organization again less powerful in 50s and 60s but still very powerful organization there was uh there was on the one and the understanding of the situation in the country and abroad that probably other other organizations didn't have they had also first peak in terms of the uh selecting cadis the the the work in the KGB was well paid and considered to be very prestigious so that's that so that was part to a degree of the Soviet Elite in terms of whom they whom they recruited and they had a resentment toward the party leadership that didn't allow them to do um James Bond kind of things that they would want to do because they were political risks after this uh scandal with stasinski um the uh at least on many levels the KGB stopped the the practice of the assassinations uh political assassinations abroad because it was considered politically to be extremely extremely dangerous the person who was in charge of the KGB at the time of Bandera assassination shapin was one of the candidates to uh replace kusov and BR used against him that Scandal abroad eventually to remove him from poit Bureau so the KGB was really was really looking at the party leadership as to a degree INE effective corrupt and who was on their way and uh from what I understand that's that's exactly the the the the attitude that um people like uh like Putin and and and people of his Circle brought brought to to power in Kremlin so the methods that KGB used they can use now and there is no no party or no no other other institution actually stopping them from doing that and um they think about my understanding the the operations abroad about foreign policy in general in terms of the KGB mindset of planning operations and executing particular operations and so on and so forth so I think a lot a lot of culture that came into existence in the Soviet KGB now became part of the culture of the of the Russian Uh Russian establishment you wrote the book The Russo Ukrainian War The Return of history that gives the full context leading up to the invasion of Ukraine by Russia in February 2022 so can you uh take me through the key moments in history that led up to this war so we'll mention the collapse of the Soviet Union we could probably go much further back but the collapse of the Soviet Union mentioned 2014 um maybe you can highlight key moments that led up to the to 2022 the key moments would be first the year 204 known for orange revolution in in Ukraine and then the year 2013 known as the revolution of dignity both were the revolts against the something that by significant part of Ukrainian population was considered to be uh completely completely unacceptable actions on the part of the government and people in the government at that time so the orange revolution of 204 was a protest against falsified presidential elections and uh um rejection of a candidate that was supported by Russia publicly supported by Russia I remember being in Moscow at that time and couldn't believe my eyes when in the center of Russia I saw a billboard with yanukovich uh the trick was that they were a lot of ukrainians in in Russia and in Moscow in particular and they they had the right to vote um so and uh it led to the election of uh Ukraine as Ukrainian president Victor yushenko who put on the on the agenda um the issue of Ukraine's membership in NATO so it was very clear pro-western orientation and um the second U case was the revolution of dignity 2013 with some of the same characters including yanukovich who at that time was already president of Ukraine and uh there the question was of the government promising the people for one year at least to sign Association agreement with European union and then turning over almost overnight and saying that they were not going to do that and that's that's how things started but then when they became really massive and why something that was called Revolution uh Euro Revolution became revolution of dignity was when the um government police uh bit up students in downtown cave uh who judging by the reports were basically already almost ready to to SP almost ready to go home and that's when roughly half of cave showed up on the streets that sort of the police behavior that sort of the was absolutely unacceptable in Ukraine uh the the still in elections and falsification of Elections was unacceptable that's where around that time and around 204 the president of Ukraine at that time lenit kuchma writes a book called uh Ukraine is not Russia and apparently the term comes from his uh his discussion with Putin when Putin was suggesting to him quite strongly to use Force against people on the maidan on the Square in cave and uh kuchma allegedly said him uh you don't understand Ukraine is not Russia uh you can't you can't do things like that you get you get pushed back and that's that's the this two events to for and then uh uh 2013 became really crucial point in terms of the uh Ukraine Direction the the survival of Ukrainian democracy which is one of very few countries in the post Soviet space where democracy survived the regional flirt with between the government leaders and and democ ocracy of the 1990s it was the all Soviet story in Russia everywhere else there was high Democratic expectations but they came pretty much to an end by the end of the decade Ukraine Ukraine preserved the democracy and the orientation of Ukraine toward toward integration into in some form into Western and European structures that that uh Ukrainian democracy plus Western orientation was something and in Russia we see the strengthening of the autocratic regime under Vladimir Putin that if you look deeper this are the processes that put the two countries on the Collision Course so there is a division a push and pull inside Ukraine on identity whether they're part of Russia or part of Europe and you highlighted two moments in Ukrainian history that there's a big flare up where this the statement was first Ukraine is not Russia and essentially Ukraine is part of Europe but there's other moments MH what were the defining moments they began an actual war in the D the the the war started in February of 2014 with the Russian takeover of uh Crimea by military force right the the so-called Green Man um and uh um the big question is is why and it's it's very important to go back to the year 2013 and uh the the start of the of the protests and the the story of the Ukraine signing Association agreement with European Union so from what we understand today the Ukrainian government under President yanukovich did this suicidal sharp turn after one year of promise and Association agreement saying that okay we changed our mind under pressure from Moscow and uh uh Moscow applied that pressure for one uh reason at least in my opinion uh the Ukraine sign an association agreement with European Union would mean that Ukraine would not be able to sign Association agreement with any Eur Union in any shape or form that that was at that time in the process of making and for Vladimir Putin that was the beginning of his or part of of his third term one of his agenda items for the third term was really uh consolidation of the of the post Soviet space and Eurasian space and not membership in NATO not membership in European Union but Association agreement with European Union meant that that posts Soviet space would have to exist under moscow's control but without Ukraine the second largest post Soviet Republic the Republic on Whose vote depended the continuing existence of the Soviet Union and whose vote ended in in many ways the existence of the Soviet Union so that is that is broadly background but but also there are of course person ities there are Al also their beliefs the their readings of history and and and um all of that became became part of the story but if if you look at that geopolitically the the association agreement is uh putting putting Ukraine outside of the Russian sphere of influence and the the the response was uh an attempt to um uh topple topple the government in cave that clearly was uh going to to sign that that agreement uh to um take over Crimea and to help to deal with a lot of issues within Russia itself and boost the the the popularity of of uh uh the president and it certainly certainly worked in that in that way as well and uh the once once Ukraine still after c continued on its path then the next step started the so-called hybrid Warfare in donbas but um again the the unlike unlike Crimea um from what from what I understand Russia was not really looking forward to taking possession of a donbas donbas was viewed as the way how to influence Ukraine to stop it from drift toward the west maybe you can tell me about the region of donbas I mentioned that nationalism and principle of nationalism is the principle of uh making the political borders to coincide with ethnic and cultural borders and that's that's how the maps of of uh many East European countries had been drawn in the 19th and 20th Century on that on that principle donbas where the majority constituted uh by the beginning of the 20th C century were ukrainians was considered to be Ukrainian and was claimed in the middle in in in the middle of this Revolution and revolutionary Wars and Civil Wars by uh Ukrainian government but Don bus became a site one of the key sites in the Russian Empire of early industrialization when it's with its mining industry with metalogical industry so what that meant was that people from other parts of not Ukraine but other parts of the Russian Empire congregated there that's that's where jobs were that's how kusov and his family came came to dbas the family of bnv overshoot a little bit they got to the Industrial Enterprises in in in the city of uh kamin near near nipro the place the city that was called nipro Petrov so those were Russian peasants moving into the area in in uh looking for for the for the job and um by the the the the population became quite mixed ukrainians still constituted the majority of the population but not necessarily in the towns and in the cities and culturally the place was becoming more and more Russian as the result of that of that movement so apart from the Crimea donbas was the part of Ukraine where the EIC Russians were the the the biggest group they were not the majority but they were very very big and significant group for example in the city of marup that was all but destroyed in the course of the last of the last two years um the ethnic Russians constituted uh over 40% of the population right so that's not exactly part of donbas but that gives you that that gives you general idea now the story of dbas uh and what happened now is is multi-dimensional and this ethnic composition is just one part of the story another very important part of the story is uh uh economy and uh dbas is a classical Rust Belt and we know what happens with the cities that were part of the first or second wave of industrialization in the United States and globally you know about social problems that exist in those places so donbas is probably the most dramatic and tragic case of implosion of the Rust Belt with the mines not anymore producing the sort of the uh and at the acceptable price the coal that they used to produce is people look losing jobs with the politicians looking for subsidies as opposed to trying very unpopular unpopular measures of uh dealing something and and bringing bringing new money and new investment into the region so all of that all of that become part uh of the story that made made it easy for uh Russia for the Russian Federation to destabilize the situation um we have interviews with Mr girkin who is saying that he was the first who pulled the trigger and and fired the short in in that war he became the Minister of Defense in the in the uh donet People's Republic you look at the Prime Minister he is another person with uh uh Moscow residency permit um so you see key figures in in those positions at the start and the beginning not being Russians from Ukraine but being being Russians from Russia and Russians from Moscow closely connected to the to the government structure and intelligence structure and so on so that is that is the start and the beginning but uh the the way how how it exploded the way it did was also a combination of of the economic and ethnocultural and linguistic factors so for Putin the war in donbas and even in 2022 is a defensive war against what the Ukraine ukan government is doing against ethnically Russian people of dbas is that fair to say how he describes it what what we see this is certainly this is certainly the argument right this is certainly the argument and um a pretext uh because what uh we see there is that there would be no and and there was no independent mobilization in Crimea either in Crimea or in donbas without Russian presence uh without Russian occupation the factor of the Crimea there would be no and and there was no before uh uh at least in the previous 5 to six years any mass mobilizations of Russians there was none of such mobilizations in in donbas before before girkin and other people with military with with um parts of military units show up there so it is it is a it is an excuse you you've been to Ukraine mhm you know that Russian language is not uh persecuted in Ukraine and um if you've not been to D buas it would be diff or to the Crimea it would be difficult to find one single Ukrainian school not that they didn't exist at all but it would take quite an effort for you to find it or sometimes if to hear Ukrainian language outside either of the institutions or or the of the uh farmers market so um that's that's that's the reality that that's the reality that is clear that is visible so uh imagine under those conditions and context that someone is is persecuting ethnic Russians or Russian speakers um want to believe in something like that one important precondition is never to step step your foot in Ukraine I should mention maybe this is a good moment to mention when I traveled to Ukraine this is after the start of the war I you mentioned Farmers Market which is funny basically every single person I talked to uh including the leadership we spoke in Russian for many of them Russian is the more comfortable language even uh and the people who spoke Ukrainian are more on the west uh western side of Ukraine and you know young people that are kind of want to show that um in an activist way that they want to fight for the independence of their country so I take your point I wonder if you want to comment about language and maybe about the future of language in Ukraine is is the future of language going to stabilize on Ukrainian or is it going to return to its traditional base of Russian language very roughly before the start of the war in 2014 we can talk about parity between Russian and Ukrainian and also with as you said clearly Ukraine being a dominant language in the west and Russian being being a dominant language uh on the streets certainly in the in the east of the country um and then in between of that two polls a number of this transitional areas and um Ukraine uh in my experience and I I visited a lot of countries not all of them and probably maybe maybe I will be still surprised but in my experience this is the only truly bilingual country that I ever visited I lived in Canada for a long period of time there is Quebec and the rest and and and and um in Ukraine you you can talk in either Russian or Ukrainian in any part of the of the country and you would be understood and you would be um responded in in a different language with the expectation that you would would understand and if you if you don't understand that means you don't come from Ukraine that's the reality the war and loss of the Crimea and uh part loss of dbas if it's major major industrial industrial areas really shifted the balance toward uh mostly Ukrainian speaking uh re reasons regions and um also uh what you see and you you clearly pointed to that starting with 2014 even a little bit earlier the younger generation chooses chooses Ukrainian as as a marker of its identity and that started in 2014 but we we we have a dramatic dramatic shift after 2022 and on the anecdotal anecdotal level I can tell you that I I speak to people who uh be in in in chv at the time this is east of Crimea at the time of of the Russian aggression and bombardment and so on and so forth who had passive knowledge of Ukrainian but spoke all their all their life Russian and they would speak Ukrainian to me and when I say okay why you doing that we we know each other for decades and you used Russian and he said well I don't want to have anything in common with people who did that to us so there is the there is a big big push of course with this with this current War now the question is whether this change is is something that will stay or not what is what is the future linguistic practices are very very conservative ones and uh we at the Harvard Ukrainian Research Institute have a project called MAA Digital Atlas of Ukraine and we were um documenting and mapping different data in time and what we noticed a spike in the people self report and of viws of Ukrainian in 2014 and 2015 at the time of the start of the war when the the the the threat was the most clear one this is self-reporting that doesn't mean that people exactly do what what but they believe that that's what that they supposed to do and then return back to to where it was by the year 2016 and 2017 so this this Dynamic can can repeat itself but given given the how long the war is going on how big the impact how big the stresses and that the the the way the wave of the future is probably associated with younger people who are switching to Ukrainian so I would I would uh uh my bet would be on on on uh Ukrainian language rising in prominence so as we get closer to February of 2022 there's a few other key moments maybe let's talk about in July 2021 uh Putin publishing an essay titled on the historical Unity of Russians and ukrainians can you describe the ideas expressed in this essay the idea is is very conveniently presented already in the first paragraph in the first sentences really of the article where Putin says that for a long time I was saying that Russians and ukrainians were one and the same people and here is the proof this is this is the the the the the historical he develops his historical argumentation apparently with the help of of of of of a lot of people around him and um he started to talk about Russians and ukrainians being one and the same people one year before the start of the war in 2014 so in 2013 he was together with patriarch Kil on visit to KF and there was conference specifically organized for him in the cave and caves Monastery and that's that's where he he he stated that the the fact that he was with patriarch Kil is is very important factor for understanding where the idea is coming from um this is the idea that was dominant in the Russian Empire of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century that Russians ukrainians and B Russians are really Russian great Russians little Russians and white Russians and that they constitute one one people yes there are some dialectical differences yes uh ukrainians sin well yes they they they dance funny but overall that's that's that that doesn't matter and the that idea actually was [Music] really destroyed mostly destroyed by the uh revolution of 1917 because it wasn't just social Revolution that's how it is understood in in in in Us in good part of the world it was also National Revolution it was an Empire it was a revolution in the in the Russian Empire and um to bring this pieces of Empire back within the Soviet Union the Bolsheviks had to make concessions and one of of those concessions was to recognition of the existence of ukrainians as a separate nation Bellar Russians as a separate Nations Russians as separate Nations endowing them with their own territorial um with borders with institutions and so on and so forth but there was one institution that was not reformed that institution was called the Russian Orthodox church because one of the ways that Bolsheviks dealt with it they couldn't eradicate religion completely but they arrested the development of the of of the religion and thinking and and and and theology uh on the level as it existed before the Revolution of 1917 so the Russian Orthodox Church of 1917 continued to be the Russian Orthodox Church in 19 in 1991 and in continuing the same Imperial Mantra of the existence of one big Russian Nation one unified people and when you see the formation of of the ideas about about Nations about foreign policy in the Russian Empire after 1991 they're going back to the pre pre- Bolshevik times ukrainians do that as well estonians do that as well the difference is that when ukrainians go back they go back to the pre-1917 their their intellectual fathers and and writings of basically liberal nationalism or sometimes they go to the radical nationalism of Banda which would be which would be not pre1 1917 but pre 1945 when the Russians go to pre- Bolshevik past looking for the ideas looking for inspiration looking for the narratives what they find there is Empire what they find there are imperial projects and and that's that's that's certainly the story of the of the Putin's claim that's the story of the argument and to to conclude the argument that he lays out there historical argument comes also almost directly from the narratives of the late 19th and the beginning of the 20th century so it's not only the argument is coming from the that era but also the argumentation is is coming from that era as well but that those arguments are all in in the flavor of Empire it's Empire on the one hand but also there is Imperial understanding of what Russian nation is that doesn't allow for independence of its little Russian and white russian branches alleged branches right so uh what what you see is the concept of the big Russian Nation that's late 19 the beginning 20th century Empire sees the writing on the wall that nationalism is on the rise and it tries to survive by mobilizing the nationalism of the largest group in the Empire which happens to be Russian um Stalin is a big promoter of the some form of Russian nationalism especially during the war and after war and he started his career as a very promising Georgian writer right in jgan yeah so he's not doing that for some personal personal Affinity or cultural intellectual Roots within within uh uh Russ within Russian Nation or Russian people he is doing that for the uh for the sake of the success of the of his Soviet and communist project and he he he has to get the largest ethnic group on board which are which are Russians but but uh Stalin and and and Putin have different understanding who Russians are Stalin Stalin already accepted ukrainians and B Russians their existence Putin Putin goes back back to pre staring and prean times so if we step back from the the historical context of this and um maybe the geopolitical purpose of writing such an essay and forget about the essay altogether you know I have in Ukraine and Russia I know a lot of people in Ukraine and Russia forget the war forget all of this there's a kind of they all kind of sound the same um like if I go to France they sound different than in Ukraine and Russia like if you lay out this the cultural map of the world there's just a different beat and music and flavor to a people I guess what I'm trying to say is there seems to be a closeness between the cultures of Ukraine and Russia like how do we describe that do we acknowledge that and how does that uh add tension with the national Independence um first of all especially when it comes to Eastern Ukraine or to big cities many people in Ukraine spoke Russian right generally it's it's the same language uh on the top of that we started our discussion with talking about the Slavs right so both Ukrainian and Russian language Are Slavic languages so there is there is proximity there as well on the top of that there is a history of existence in uh the Soviet Union and before that in one Empire for a long period of time so you see a lot of a lot of before the war a lot of Ukrainian sers and entertainers performing in Russia and vice vers and biography of President zalanski is certainly one of the fits fits that that that particular particular uh model as well that that all talks about about similarities but this similarities also very often obscure things that uh that became so important in the course of this war and I already mentioned the book uh titled by by by President kushma of Ukraine Ukraine is not Russia so that's that's the argument despite the fact that you think that we are the same we behave differently and it turned out that they behave differently you have botne in in Moscow and police violence and that's the end of it you have the um maidan in Ukraine and you have police violence and that's that's the beginning that's not the end history really matters in in the way why why uh sometimes people speaking the same language with different accents behave very differently Russia and Russian identity was formed around the state and has difficulty imagining itself outside of the state and that state happened to be Imperial from most of Russian history Ukrainian project came into existence in against the state Ukraine came into existence out of the parts of different Empires which means they left different cultural impact on them and for ukrainians to stay together autocratic regime so far didn't work it's like the colonies of the United States you have to you have to find common language you you have to talk to each other and that became part of the Ukrainian political DNA and that that became a huge factor in the war and um very few people in Ukraine believed what what Vladimir Putin was saying that Russians and ukrainians were one and the same people but the majority believed that they're certainly close culturally and historically Nations and from that point of view the bombardment of the Ukrainian cities became such a shock to the ukrainians because down they they maybe looked at Syria they looked at chich and were explaining that through the fact that there was basically such a big cultural Gap and difference between Russians and and and those those countries and those Nations but I I I I my understanding at least most of them had difficulty Imagining the war of that proportion and that that sort of ferocity and that sort of war crimes the the the bringing that sort of war crimes and on that level so it's interesting that you say that in the DNA of Ukraine versus Russia so maybe Russia is more conducive to authoritarian regimes and Ukraine is more conducive to defining Itself by rebelling against authoritarian regimes uh by Rebellion absolutely and that was the story pretty much before 1991 so what you see since 1991 and what you see today is a I would say new Factor certainly in Ukrainian modern history because ukrainians traditionally were very successful Rebels the largest peasant Army in the Civil War in the Russian Empire was the mahau Army in southern Ukraine and one one revolt kak revolts and other revolts one after another but ukrainians had historically difficulty actually uh maintaining the sort of Freedom that they acquired had difficulty associating thems with the state and what we see especially in the last two years it's it's a quite phenomenal development in Ukraine when ukrainians associate themselves with the state where ukrainians um see a state not just as a foreigner as historically it was in Ukrainian history not just someone who came to to take but the state that is continuation of them that helps to provide security for them that the the the Ukrainian Armed Forces even before the start of this war had the the highest U highest uh support and popularity in in Ukraine uh this state today functions uh unbelievably effectively under attacks and missile attacks and again city government and local government and it's it's we we are witnessing when it comes to Ukraine we are witnessing a very important historical development where ukrainians found their state for the first time through through most through most of their history and try to make a transition from successful Rebels to successful managers and state Builders yeah I talked to John Mima recently uh there there's a lot of people that believe NATO had a big contribution to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 so what what role did NATO play in this full history from Bucharest in 20 uh in 2008 to to today NATO uh was uh a big part certainly of the uh Russian uh justification for the war that was the thing that was uh up there in the months leading to the to the aggression uh the truth is that uh and Vladimir Putin went on records staying that that the Western leaders were telling him again and again that uh there is no chance for Ukraine to become member of NATO anytime soon Russia was very effective back in the year 208 in stopping Ukraine and Georgia on the path of joining NATO there was a Bucharest Summit at which the US president at that time George W Bush was pushing for the membership and Putin convinced uh leaders of France and Germany to block that that membership and after that membership for um Ukraine and for Georgia was really removed from the from the realistic agenda for NATO and that's that's what the leaders of the Western World in the month leading to the February 2022 aggression were trying to to convey to Vladimir Putin what uh he wanted there was an ultimatum that really was uh there to um not to start negotiations but really to stop negotiations he demanded the withdrawal of NATO to the borders of the 1997 if I if I'm not mistaken so completely something that neither leaders would accept nor the countries members of NATO would accept but for me it's very clear that that was that that was an excuse that that was a justification and what happened uh later in the year 2022 and 2023 certainly confirms me in that in that belief uh Finland joined NATO and Sweden is on the way to join in NATO so uh Finland joining NATO increased uh border between Russia and NATO toold and probably more than that so if NATO is the real concern it would be probably not completely unreasonable to expect that if not every single soldier but at least half of the Russian army fighting in Ukraine would be moved to protect the new border with nato in Finland so I have no doubt that no one in Kremlin either in the past or today looks favorably or is excited about n U take NATO moving or the countries of Eastern Europe joining NATO but I have very difficult time imagining that that was the primary cause of the war and uh what we see also we talked about Tucker's interview he was surprised but he believed that Putin was completely honest when the first 25 minutes of interview he was talking about relations between Russia and Ukraine was talking about history and that was also the uh main focus of his essay essay was not on NATO and Russia essay was on Russia and Ukraine so that is where the the the real causes are the broader context is the fall of Empire and process of disintegration of Empire not the story of NATO what was to clarify the reason Putin Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022 the immediate goal in 2014 when the war started was to stop the drift of Ukraine toward the west and outside of the Russian sphere of influence the uh invasion of 2022 uh perceived the same the same goals uh keeping Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence once we have the uh resistance and quite effective resistance on the part of Ukraine the U Ramstein and Coalition International Coalition in support of Ukraine then we see the realization of Plan B where parts of Ukrainian territory are being annexed and included in the constitution of the Russian Federation so the two scenarios don't exclude each other but if if scenario number one doesn't work then scenario number two goes goes into play in uh the gates of Kev chapter you right about Vadim zalinsky in the early days of the War uh what are most important moments to you about this time the the first hours and days of the invasion the first hours and the first days were the most difficult psychologically the rest of the world really didn't expect cave to last for more than few days didn't expect Ukraine to last for more than few weeks and uh uh all the data suggested that that's what would happen Ukraine would collapse would be taken over uh Putin called his uh his uh War a special military operation which suggests you also expectations about the scope expectations about the time so semi-military semi police police operation so every reasonable person in the world believed that that would would happen and it's the heroism of quote unquote unreasonable people like zalinski like the commander of Ukrainian Armed Forces zi like mayors of the Cities Klitschko and others I'm just naming names that are familiar to to almost all of us now but there are thousands of those people unreasonable people who decided that it was unreasonable to attack their country and uh that that that was that was the most the most difficult times and days and speaking about zalanski every I understand reasonable leader in the west was trying to convince him to leave Ukraine and to set a government in Exile in in Poland or in London um and it was reasonable to accept his uh one of his predecessors Mr yanukovich flat cave uh a few months before that in Afghanistan the president of Afghanistan fled Afghanistan that was a reasonable thing to expect and uh he turned out to be very very unreasonable in that in that sense that's that comes with the guts his gods and gods people around him and and ukrainians in general why do you think he stayed in Kev this former comedian who played a president on TV when Kev is being invaded by the second most powerful military in the world because I think he believes in things and and and one of of those things was that if he president and he is in the presidential office he is there to play his role to the end and another thing my personal again I never met zalinski my personal understanding of him is that he's uh has talent that helped him in his career before the presidency and then helps now he feels the audience and then channels the the the attitude of the audience and and uh amplifies it and I think that uh another reason why he didn't leave K was that he fell the audience the audience in that in that particular context were the ukrainians so he had a sense that the ukrainians would unify because he was quite if you look at the polls before the war quite unpopular and and there was still divisions and uh factions and the government is divided I mean there there's the East and the west and all this kind of stuff you think he had a sense that this could unite people um the East and the West was not already such an issue after um after Crimea and part of donbas being gone so Ukraine was much more united than it was before uh he brought to power his before that really non-existent party of regions on his personal popularity but the important thing is that he created uh a majority in the parliament which really reflected the unity that existed among ukrainians that didn't was not there before he won with 73% of the population uh of of of those who took part in in the elections his predecessor P penko also carried 90% of the of the precincts and the same happened with zalinsky so the country unified after 2014 to a degree it was impossible to to imagine before and zalinsky felt that zalinsky knew that and um that's that's that's where where the talent of politician really matters so that that's that's something that you can see beyond beyond just data and and and you can feel that PR yelson had that ability why did the peace talks fail there was a lot of peace talks well the the main reason is that the conditions that uh Russia was trying to impose on Ukraine were basically unacceptable for Ukraine um because uh one of the conditions apart from this strange thing called dentification uh was of course def facto loss of the territory and for the future uh really um staying outside either of NATO or any any any Western support which was very clear you can buy a couple of weeks you can by a couple of months but in the conditions like that Russia will come back tomorrow and will take over everything and uh once once ukrainians realize that they can win on the battlefield once the Russians were defeated and withdraw from cave uh the the opportunity emerged to get out of the of the negotiations which was very clear were leading if not today then tomorrow to the complete destruction of Ukraine and then of of course once the territory started to be liberated things like Butcher and and massacres of the civilian population came to the four which made also quite difficult if not impossible to conduct negotiations from this moral and emotional point of view what about the claims that you know Boris Johnson the West uh compromised the ability of these peace talks to be successful basically kind of uh manipulated the talks I asked uh people who accompanied bris Johnson to Cave that question uh the answer was no and um I believe this answer and I'll tell you why um because it is very difficult for me to imagine president zalinski to take orders from anybody in the world either B is J Johnson or or or Joe Biden or anybody else and basically doing things that zalinsky beliefs are not in his interest or in the interest of his country I just can't imagine that anybody in the world telling zalinski what to do and zalinski actually following it uh against his own his own wishes and desires at least if if that is possible what is in the public sphere doesn't allow us to to suggest that it is that said zans is a smart man and he knows that the war can only continue with West support that is a different supposition to know that it can continue with the West support but if we are talking about withdrawing from the negotiations that's that's not about the continuation of the war for that you don't need best support well what I mean is if he started to sense that the West will support no matter what then maybe the space of decisions you're making is different we can interpret that that way but uh uh Boris Johnson represented at that point Britain not the United States and uh really what what the war showed and it was clear already at that time that what was needed was massive support from from the West as a whole and the promise of that support came only after the West realized that Ukraine can win and came only in late uh April is the Ramstein so at least a few weeks later so I don't know how much bris Johnson could promise he probably could promise to try to help and and try to convin Vince and try to work on that if if zalinski acted on that promise he certainly was taken a risk but the key issue again I'm going back where I started it's a principal an acceptance for Ukraine the conditions that were offered and Ukraine was uh the moment they saw the possibility that they could fight back with Johnson's support without Johnson support they they took the chance so what are the ways this work can end do you think what are the different possible trajectories whether it's peace talks what does winning look like VI the side what is the role of us what what trajectories do you see that are possible it's it's uh question on the one level very easy to answer on the other very difficult the level on which it is very easy it's it's a broad historical perspective if you really believe and I believe in that that this is the war of the Soviet succession that this is the war of the disintegration of Empire we know how this story ends and they end with disintegration of Empire they end with the rise of the new States and appearance of the new colored Sports on the map that's the story that started with the American Revolution so that's that's long-term perspective the difficult part is of course what will happen tomorrow the difficult part is what what there will be in in in two days in or even in two years and um in very broad terms the the war can end in one of three scenarios the victory of one side the victory of another side and a sort of a St stal mate and compromise especially when it comes when it comes to the territories this war is already approaching the end of the second year I follow the the news and look analysis I don't remember one single piece suggesting that the next year we will bring peace or we'll bring peace for sure and uh we we are in in a situation where uh the both sides still believe that they can achieve something or prove their position on the battlefield certainly that was the expectations of Ukrainian side uh back in the in the in the summer and and early fall of 2023 and from what I understand now this are certainly the expectations of the Russian side today this is this is the largest war in Europe since World War II the largest war in the world since Korean War and uh we know know that that the the uh Korean war ended in this division division of Korea but the negotiations were going on for more than two years while those negotiations were going on both sides were trying to improve their position there and until there was a political change death of Stalin arrival of Asen in the United States and the realization that the the chance of succeeding on the battlefield uh huge the peace talks didn't come so at this point all three scenarios are possible I don't I don't really discount any of them it's early early to to say what will happen so without any political change let's try to imagine what are the possibilities that the war ends this year is it possible that it can end with compromise basically at the place it started meaning back to the borders of 2022 yeah back to the borders of 22 with some security guarantees that aren't really guarantees but are hopeful guarantees no it's it's is it is not just virtual impossibility it is impossible without political change in Moscow the reason is that back in the fall of 2022 uh Vladimir Putin included five of Ukrainian region solists even those that he didn't control or didn't control fully into the Russian Constitution which basically in simple language is that the hands are tied up not only for Putin himself but also for his possible successors so that's means that no return to the borders of 2022 without without change political change in Moscow are possible um a few days after after that that that that decision in Moscow uh zansky uh issued a decree saying that no negotiations with Russia what what that really meant in plain language is that basically we are not prepared to negotiate a stable agreement with five of our o blists not just Ann nexted but also included into the Russian Constitution so that's where we are so the that that scenario is is uh again everything is possible of course but it's highly highly unlikely so the Russian Constitution is a is a thing that's very that makes this all very difficult yes and not only as a negotiation tactic for Putin whoever would would negotiate on the Russian side but also as as a legal issue so like the Practical aspect of it even is yes you really have to uh change the Constitution before the peace agreement takes hold or immediate medely after that and with the Minsk agreements that was one of things that uh Russia wanted from Ukraine change of the Constitution and it turned out to be really impossible so that that's one of the one of the Back stories of of the Minsk and and collapse of the Minsk agreements is there something like M Minsk agreements that are possible now to maybe this is a legal question but to override the Constitution to sort of shake everything up so see the Constitutional Amendment as a uh as just a negotiation tactic to to come to the table to something like M Minsk agreement given uh how how fast those those amendments to the Constitution were adopted uh that suggests that really executive power in in Russia has enormous power over the the legislative branch so it's it's Again difficult to imagine but technically this is possible again if if the but but possible if there is a political change in Moscow I don't understand why assuming political change in Moscow is not possible this year so I'm trying to see if there's a way to end this war this year right there is a possibility of armistice right but Armistice more along the like any Armistice along the lines of the current front lines but withdrawal of the Russian troops to the borders of 2022 at this point whether it's reasonable or unreasonable can be achieved all only as the result of the defeat of the Russian army like it happened near cave is it possible possible is it likely especially given what is happening with the Western support military support for for for Ukraine probably not but if Putin the executive branch has a lot of power why can't the United States President the Russian president the Ukrainian president come to the table and draw up something like the M Minsk agreements where and then rapid constitutional change is made and you go back to the borders in 2022 before 2022 like through agreements through compromise impossible for you certainly not this year I look at this year as the time when at least one side Russian side will try to get as much as it can through the through military means but that's been happening last year too there's been a counter offensive there's been attempts there's been it doesn't mean that uh every that New Year somehow is supposed to bring new tactics uh that the the last year was uh pretty much a lot of fighting a lot of suffering very little movement of the of the front line the biggest change of the last year was Ukraine Victory on the on the Black Sea where they pushed the the Russian Navy into the western part of the pond and restored the the grain Corridor and export from Odessa apparently up to 75% of what it used to be before the war so that's that's the the only major change but again the the price is enormous in terms of wealth in terms of especially in terms of so thinking about what 2024 brings zalinski just fired Ukraine's head of the army a man you've mentioned General valer uh zi what do you make of this development this is a very very dangerous moment in in the War uh the reason for that is that Z is someone who is very popular with the Army and with people in general so if you look at that through American prism that would be something analogous to President Truman firing General Maur uh given that Stakes for us at that time were very high but probably not as high as they are for Ukraine for Ukraine today in both cases what is at stake is certainly the idea that the political leadership and Military leadership have to be on the same page and uh the question is whether on the part of zalinski this is just the change of the leadership or this is also the change of his approach to the war and then can can can mean many things one can mean him taking more active part in planning operations it can mean all also possible change of the tactic in the war giving that counter offensive didn't didn't work out uh we don't know yet I don't know whether president zinsky at this point knows exactly what what will come next but this is this is the time when the the change of the leadership in the country and in the army that is at War it's it's it's one of the most most try and most dangerous moments so the thing that President Z he expressed is that this is this is going to be a change of tactics making the uh the approach more technologically advanced this kind of things but as you said uh I believe he is less popular than uh the chief of the army zy 80% to 60% depending on the polls do you think it's possible that zalinsky days are numbered as the president and that somebody like Z comes to power what we know is that uh in this War uh Ukrainian people really United around their president and uh the armed forces were always even before the start of the war more popular than was the presidential office so the change if if happened in that Realm was not was not so dramatic and from what I can see from from social media in Ukraine there is a lot of unhappiness a lot of questions but there is also realization and very strong realization that country has to stay United and certainly the behavior of zy himself is there basically not suggesting any sort of a pran type of of scenario that gives me some hope actually a lot of Hope and in terms of whether zin's days are numbered or not I don't think they're numbered uh but if Ukraine stays a democracy and I believe it will stay the what comes to my mind uh is the story of uh Churchill uh the story of deal in Poland the story of pilsudski so once the war is over really the the electorate in the in the Democratic elections they want to change the political leadership they want to move forward but uh puski came back to Power and deal came back to Power and Churchill came back to Power so no I I whatever happens in the in the short run or medium-term run I think that uh zinsky days in politics are not numbered so what to you is interesting uh for example if I get a chance to interview zalinsky what what do you is interesting about the the person that that would be good to ask about to explore about the state of his mind is thinking his view of the world as it stands today next month we supposed to take place Ukrainian elections they're not taking place because the major majority of ukrainians don't think this is a right thing to do to change the president to have the elections to have a political struggle in the middle of the war so zansky refused to call those elections despite the fact that he he uh is and continues to be the most popular politician in Ukraine so it would be in his to his benefit but that's that's clearly not what what the ukrainians want but the question of continuing as the president Beyond 5 Years also one way or another would raise questions about the legitimacy and certainly certainly Russia will be playing this card like there is no tomorrow and what I would be interested in asking the lsky about whether whether he sees that his second term which comes on those conditions would suggest a different different attitude over the position maybe some form of the of the um uh coalition government like it was the case in Britain with Churchill under different circumstances of course or this is basically in his opinion something that would be destructive and something that would would really be an impediment for for the issue for the question of unity and war effort and I would ask this question not uh not to basically suggest that that's that's the way to go but I I would be very much interested to to hear what is his thinking about that is do you think there's a degree during war time that the power that comes with being a war president can corrupt the person sort of uh push you away from uh the Democratic mindset towards an authoritarian one I think that there is a possibility of that right you in the conditions of any any emergency war in in the case of the Soviet Union there was a Chernobyl disaster and so on and so forth you make decisions much faster you you you create this vertical and um then it's it's very easier to get to get really used to that way dealing with the issues in in the conditions of emergency right and and then either continue emergency or or with no emergency they continuing the emergency mode I I think um again that that would be a very very natural thing for any human being to to do to make it easier should I do that easier and in more effective way or should I do the right way that's that's a challenge it's it's it's it's it's sometimes it's difficult to answer this question let me stay in power for just a little longer to do it the efficient way Y and then time flies away and all of a sudden you're it's it's you're you're going for the third term and the fourth term and suddenly it's easy to realize that actually you can't controll in any other way you just whatever skills you had or people around that can help is that already gone exactly the people that's suround you are uh not providing the kind of uh critical feedback necessary for a democratic system one of the things that Tucker said after his interview with Putin he was just in his hotel just chatting on on video and he said that he felt like Putin was not very good at explaining himself like a coherent whole Narrative of why the invasion happened it's just this big picture and he said that's not because he doesn't have one but it's been a long time since he's had somebody around him where he has to explain himself too so he's out of practice which is very interesting it's a very interesting point and that's what war and being in power for a prolonged period of time can do so on that topic if you had a chance to talk to Putin what kind of questions would you ask him what would you like to find out about the man as he stands today as a historian I have a lot of questions and I have questions about when when the decision was made to attack Ukraine and what went into this decision because we we are thinking about that we trying so as a historian I I have this this this big question have question about the Crimea when those decisions were made so that sort of questions that that interest me but the rest either I think I understand what is going on with him or I don't expect the answer that can help for for example a good question whether you regret or not the start of the war in 2022 given given the enormous enormous casualties on both sides but you can't expect from a politician an honest answer to this question right so there are questions to which I know he can't answer honestly and then there are other questions to which I think he already provided all answers that he could so what what for me is is is of Interest are basically questions for a historian about about the the timing and and the and the and the logic of particular decisions well I do wonder how different what he says publicly is from what he thinks privately so a question about when the decision to invade Ukraine happen is a very good question to give insight to the difference between how he thinks about the world privately versus what he says publicly yeah and same about other you know about Empire is if you ask uh Putin he will say he has no interest in Empire and he finds the notion silly but at the same time perhaps privately there's a sense in which he does uh seek the the reunification of the Russian Empire not in the form of the Russian Empire not in the form of the Soviet Union but certainly in some form of the Russian control that's that's uh that's for me at least it's quite clear otherwise there would be no bursts to the bust to the to the Russian Emperors and Katherine and and and others you wrote in your book titled uh the Frontline essays on Ukraine's past and present about the Russian question uh I guess articulated by Soldier niten first in 1994 soen of course is the author of gag archipelago he's half Ukrainian what is the Russian question s clearly identifies himself as Russian and his opposition to the Communist Regime was was AOS of a Russian nationalist so his argument was that um communism was bad for Russia um and uh for him Russian question is about the Russians ethnic Russians but also he was thinking about Russians in in Putin's terms or PU thinks in Solan terms about ukrainians and B Russians Constitution part of that so the Russian question is the biggest tragedy of the 20th century the division of the Russians the the loss of the statehood and division of the Russians between different different states this is this is forit in Russian question and his original idea and plan was presented in the essay that he published in 1990 was called how we should restructure Russia and restructure Russia meant getting rid of the baltics Central Asia and Caucasus and have Russians ukrainians and B Russians including those who live in northern Kazakhstan to create one nation state so he was a Russian nationalist but he was thinking about Russian nation state as the state of Russians ukrainians and B Russians and once the Soviet Union collapsed and his his idea was not implemented in the 1990s he formulated Plan B taken over by Russia of donbas Crimea and Southern Ukraine the areas that now are included in the Russian Constitution so in terms in historical terms and intellectual terms what is happening today in in the war between Russia and Ukraine is the The Vision on one level or another level that was formulated by the noble laat alexand suus half Russian half Ukraine if if there is such a thing what what would you say is the Ukrainian question as we stand today the Ukrainian question is very simple it's now it's not any more acquisition of the nation state but actually a sovereign state but it's it's it's maintainance so it's Ukrainian question is like dozens of other questions in the 20th and 21st century the rise the rise of the new state and uh that's that's that's what is the Ukrainian question whether whether Ukraine will continue to its existence as a nation as an independent state because that existence is being questioned by stating that Russians and ukrainians are one and the same people which the facto saying your guy is Russian and also trying to to destroy the state is it possible that if the war in Ukraine continues for many more years that the next leader that follows zalinski would uh take Ukraine away from a sort of democratic western style Nation towards a more authoritarian one maybe even with a far right influence this kind of Direction because of the war the influence of War everything is possible and the longer the war continues the more likely scenario like that becomes but um realization of that scenario would go against the grain of largest part of Ukrainian history where Ukraine really emerged as a pluralistic state in which the elements of democracy were built in the last 30 years would go against the grain of the Ukrainian Society where as one author formulated in the 1990s he wrote a book Ukrainian nationalism and minority Faith where the nationalism was a minority faith and radical nationalism continues to be at continued to be in 2019 a minority faith during the last elections so possible but unlikely given the historical realities of the last 30 plus years I could talk to you for many more hours uh on Chernobyl alone uh since you've written a book on Chernobyl and nuclear disaster this there's just a million possible conversations here but let me just jump around history uh a little bit back to World War back before World War II uh my grandmother lived through hore in World War II Nazi occupied uh Ukraine uh hollmore what do you learn let's say about human nature and about governments and nations from the fact that hore happened and maybe you could say what it is and why it happened hore is a massive famine in Ukraine um between the years 1932 and 1934 and um it happened as the result of forceful collectivization of the Agriculture and aemp on the part of Stalin also really roll Ukraine into the Soviet Union um with basically no no potential opposition from from Ukraine uh uh now National Communists so two things came together in December of 1932 when in the same decree Stalin and Molotov sign a decree on the requisition of the grain which lead eventually to the mass starvation and on the Banning of Ukrainian language Publications and education out in other Soviet republics outside of Ukraine and introducing limitations on the uh the so-called ukrainization policies so on the use of Ukrainian language in Ukraine itself and uh the the numbers are debated the the numbers that uh most of the scholars work today are 4 million but again there are larger numbers as well that that circulate and uh uh this is the the the the Famine of 3233 was not exclusive uh Ukrainian phenomenon but most of Ukraine F in the Soviet Union died in Ukraine and Ukraine was the only place where the policy on collecting grain were coming together with the policy of the Clans and of the political leadership sending people from Moscow to take over the leadership and attack on Ukrainian culture so in terms of what I learn about human nature it's more me learning about the the ideologies of the 20th century because it's not the only famine in the Communist lands the famine in China which was in terms of the numbers much more devastating than that it's in a different category and for a good reason but you have Holocaust what unites these things are are is the time this is 20th century what unites them are the dominance in the societies that are doing that really uh ideologies that not just devalued human life but considered that actually the way forward is by destroying large group of populations defined ethnically religiously socially or otherwise which tells about the time but tells also about Humanity because for centuries before that human life was valued they were enemies but the idea was that human life can put and and you can at the end of the day they can be slaves they can be you can use them for productive force uh countries in the 18th century with Southern Ukraine they were looking for settlers for people to bring and and and live on land you you move into the 20th century and there is mass destruction of the population in the name of ideologist which basically are by definition destroy human lives and uh that's what really so shocking and striking because that's that break with not just with issues of morale not just with issues of humanity with any Common Sense what is what is happening and uh I I am absolutely convinced that we didn't learn the lesson I am absolutely convinced that we didn't learn the lesson with turning our page on fascism and communism we somehow decided that we are free of that that at least in those terms history came to an end that what is ahead is is the future and nothing of that sort would would happen would take place to a degree that people would get in trouble for comparing any statements or or events that are happening today with the the communism or fascism and and um so I I I feel responsibility of myself and as a historian in particular for not not doing a better job about about telling people that well we we are we are who we are and we we have as humans our dark side and we have to be we have to be very careful so there is a human capacity uh to be captured by an idea and ideology that claims to bring up a better world as the Nazis did as Soviet Union did and on the path of doing that devaluing human life that we will bring a better world and and if millions of people have to be tortured on the way to that all right but at least we have a better world and human beings are able to if not accept that look the other way yes yes and in the name of a particular Nation or race like like was the Third Reich or in in the name of the uh Humanity of the future so um not just your human life destroy human life is there something fundamental about communism and centralized planning that's part of the problem here maybe this also connects the story of Chernobyl where the Chernobyl disaster is not just a story of failure of a nuclear power plant but it's an entire institution uh of the scientific the nuclear institution but the entirety of the government there is and there is a number of factors of political and social character that that produced Chernobyl and uh uh one of them is generally the um atmosphere of secrecy in the Soviet Union uh in the conditions of the Cold War um Chernobyl reactor was a dual purpose reactor it could boil water today and produce enriched uranium tomorrow right so it was top secret and if there were problems with that with that reactor those problems were kept secret even at people who operated that reactor that's that's what happened that that's what happened in chernov another another big big part of the story which is um specifically Soviet that's the nature of the managerial culture and administrative culture in which people had no right to make their own decisions in their in their place in their position uh a few years before that Three Mile Island happened which was a big big nuclear disaster but in terms of consequences nothing nothing like Chernobyl and uh there in the context of the American legal culture and maneral culture people who were uh operators who were in managerial positions that was their responsibility to take decisions President Carter came there but he was not calling shots on on none of those issues what you see with Chernobyl and people who saw HBO serious know that very well the moment the high official arrives everyone actually falls in line it's the official who calls the shot and to move population from the city of preit you needed the okay coming from Moscow from the from the very top so that is Soviet story story and and there is a global story of cutting Corners to to meet either deadlines like it was with that test that they were running at that time or to meet production quarters this is not just socialist thing you can replace production quarters with with um profit and and uh and you you get you get the same story so some parts of in that story are generally reflective of of our of our today's world in general others are very specific very specific for Soviet Union for for Soviet experience and then the biggest the biggest probably Soviet part of that story is that on the one hand the government in Moscow and Cave they mobilize all resources to deal with that but they keep information about what is happening and the radiation clouds secret from the from the rest of the population something that completely would be impossible and was impossible in Us in UK where other accidents happened and uh then guess what a few years later the Soviet Union collapses very much also thanks to the mobilization of people over the issue of Chernobyl and nuclear energy in uh people writing about that that subject call it echon nationalism ecological nationalism which comes at least in part from with withholding information from people and in Ukraine mobilization didn't start over the issues that led to Independence didn't start over the issue of language or didn't start over the issue of national autonomy it started under the slogans tell us the truth about about Chernobyl we want to know whether we live in contaminated areas or not and that was a very very strong uh factor that that crossed the the not just ethnic religious linguistic lines L between members of the party and not members of the party of the top leadership and not in Military and civilian because it turned out that the party car didn't protect you from being affected by by radiation so the all national mobilization happens the first mass manifestations are about Chernobyl not about anything else that's fascinating I mean uh for people who might not know Chernobyl is located in Ukraine it would be it's a fascinating view that choba might be one of the critical sort of threshold Catalyst for the collapse of the Soviet Union that's very interesting uh what just as a small side uh I guess this is a good moment to give some love to the HBO series it made me even though it's British accents and so on uh it made me realize that some of these stories in Eastern Europe could be told very effectively uh through film through series it was quite a it's I mean it was so incredibly well done and maybe I can ask you historically speaking um were you impressed uh I was I was and I think that the miniseries are very truthful on on a number of levels and very untruthful on some others and uh they got they got excellent in very well the the macro and micro levels so the macro level is the issue of the big truth and and the the story there is very much built around the theme that I just discussed now it's about the the the cost of lies right and the Soviet Union line to the people and and and that's that's what the film explores so that that that's I call it a big truth about Chernobyl and they got a lot of uh minor things really really very well like the curtains on the Windows like how the houses looked from inside and outside I didn't see any post Soviet film or any Western film that would be so good at capturing those everyday details but then there is a huge gray area in between big truth and small truth is of the of the recreating the environment and that's how you get from one to another and then you see the KGB officers coming and taking someone out of the meting and arresting which was not necessary you see the Soviet boss threatening someone to throw the person from the helicopter so you get this Hollywood sort of things despite the fact that it's HBO HBO serious and um they're the best really in terms as as a film in the fourth uh episode where they completely decided just to hell with the reality and let's let's make a film so they bring legasov to the one of the key character to the um this court meetings that they bring uh the key Soviet party B Shina he wasn't there they created a drama there so but uh so they they they got they got the main thing the big truth right and that's that's why I like this this this production sometimes you have to uh to show what something felt like you have to go bigger than it actually was I mean if you I don't know if you experience heartbreak and you want to and you see a film about it you want there to be explosions you want to see this this in images visible right so and uh but the the question again I just mentioned KGB marching in and and or some party leader G giving a speech they were not given that speech but the sense was was there and it was in the air and I as people of my generation who were there knew that and recognized that but for for New Generation whether they are in Ukraine in Russia in Us in Britain in in in Zimbabwe anywhere yeah you have to you have to do this this um little little untruths and and introduce them and I had a very interesting uh on on air conversation with uh the U author of The Script meon and I asked him the question of okay the film declared really the importance of the truth but how do you square that with with the need in the film to to uh really uh put it mildly to go beyond beyond the measures of Truth what what our understanding of that term is well I suppose it is a bit terrifying that some of the most dramatic moments in history are probably quite mundane the decisions to begin Wars invasions they're probably something like a a zoom meeting on a on a random Tuesday in today's workplace so it's not it's not like there's dramatic music playing these are just human decisions and they command armies and they command destruction um I I person because of that believe in the power of individuals to to to be able to stop Wars not just start wars individual leaders so let me just ask you about nuclear safety because there's an interesting point you make you uh wrote In the book in in Adams and Ash as a global history of nuclear disaster so technically nuclear energy is extremely safe terms a number of people died per energy generated it's much safer than coal and oil for example as far as I understand but the case you also to make is you write quote many of the political economic social and cultural factors that led to the accidents of the past are still with us today making the nuclear industry vulnerable to repeating old mistakes in new and unexpected ways and any new accidents are certain to create new anti-nuclear mobilization and then you continue with this makes the nuclear industry not only risky to operate but also impossible to count on as a long-term solution to an overwhelming problem so can you explain that perspective it's it's an interesting it's an interesting one soort of speaking to the psychology when an accident does happen it has a dramatic effect and uh also speaking to the fact that accidents can happen not because of the safety of the nuclear power plant but of the underlying structure of government that oversees it yes I wrote book on Chernobyl and then tried to understand Chernobyl better about placing it in the context of other disasters as a historian and was looking at the political factors and social factors and cultural factors not not the physics or or or or engineering part part of the story and um the the factors that are still with us uh are the like it was the case in Chernobyl the authoritarian regimes right and and and high centralization of the decision making and desire to cut corners and also the issues associated with secrecy so that's that's that that that is with us if you look at the where the future of the nuclear industry is now at this point it's the regimes and parts in the Middle East that's a big New Frontier the countries that are not particularly known for the history of of democratic existence uh where we also have the situation that we had at Three Mile Island that we had at at uh uh Chernobyl this is the first generation Engineers nuclear Engineers right so people who are where the um country doesn't have a lot of experience in gener Generations after Generations working in that particular industry where it's all new that's that's certainly that is certainly additional additional risk and um what we got now with this current war is something that not that people completely didn't expect but didn't happen in the past you see the war coming to the nuclear sides Chernobyl was taken over by the Russian army or National Guard rather uh the first day of the invasion then there was Zaria the largest nuclear power plant in Europe where the battle was waged on the territory of the nuclear power plant uh the the missiles being fired buildings Catching Fire and um the the situation of the that brought the Fukushima disaster was there at zap Poria more than once and Fukushima came because the s were shut down as they add zapia but they still needed electricity to bring water and to cool them down and in Fukushima case it was the tsunami that cut off the supply of electricity in the case of zapara there was the war fair that was happening in the area around zapia that did did the same effect so we have 440 reactors in the world today plus minus none of them was designed to withstand the direct missile attack or to function in the conditions of the Warfare if operators they're human then they make mistakes like they did at Three Mile Island or Chernobyl but think also if the war is happening around them if they're not sure what is happening with their with their families uh if they don't know whether they will be next missile whether we'll hit the uh room where where they the control room or not that that multiplies also so we we are in a situation where um we are not done yet with the nuclear accidents you each time it's not like we don't pay attention or we don't learn smart people work on that and after every accident try to figure the way how not to to to to step in in into the same into the same trap but next accident would actually expose a new new vulnerability you deal with Chernobyl and then tsunami comes you deal with tsunami and then War comes and we we really in that sense um we have sometimes wild imagination but sometimes it's difficult to imagine what can happen next so we're not done there will be there will be nuclear accidents unfortunately in the future and that makes nuclear energy so problematic when you count on it to fight climate change I'll explain why you gave the figures how many people die from burning coal from how many people die from from radiation and it's it's it's a good argument some people would question them because it's also the issue of not just dying but uh impact impact of radiation on on cancer on on our health which is not completely understood yet so it's still there there is a lot of question marks but let's assume what you are saying that's the figures that's how it is but we as people we for whatever reason are not afraid of coal but we are very much afraid of radiation it's invisible it's it's co it's everywhere MH and you can't you can't see it mhm and then and and then you start having issues and and then you have St problems and um during the covid the the governments closed the borders maybe maybe good idea maybe not so good ideas I isolation so that was the way government started to to fight for access to uh fiser to to Mna to to to Sputnik to to whatever it is to to vaccine uh so now back to the to the radiation what is happening once once Chernobyl happens uh that's the the highest point in the development of nuclear industry so far in terms of how many how many new reactors were commissioned or the the licenses were issued uh the next react reactor after 3 m Island in the US us go ahead was given it seems to me 10 years ago or something like that the Fukushima happens the reaction is in China to that as well they're very much concerned so there is a saying in the in the field Chernobyl anywhere is Chernobyl everywhere after Fukushima Germany decides to go nuclear free and and gets there at the expense of burning burning coal so that's that's how we react and each major accident that that means Global freeze on the on the on the nuclear reactor production for at least another 10 years so that's what I mean that nuclear industry is polit not just in terms of of of Technology not just in terms of radiation impact on health but also politically a very very unreliable option and to you you suspect that that's an irreparable aspect of human nature and the human mind that there's certain things that just create a kind of panic invisible threats of this kind whether it's a virus or um or radiation there's something about the mind if I get a stomach a in the United States after Fukushima I kind of think it's probably radiation this kind of uh irrational type of thinking and that's not possible to repair I think we can we can be we can bet tray right we can be pretty smart aren't we but but generally we are afraid of things that we see but even more we afraid of things that we don't see and radiation is one of those let's zoom out on the world we talked about the war in Ukraine how does the war in Ukraine change the world order we just look at everything that's going on zoom out a bit China the Israel Gaza War so the Middle East India what is interesting to you important to think about in the coming years and decades as a historian and I'm training that way uh I have a feeling of deu I see the the the cold war is coming back in many in many of its of its features and um the war started and and we discussed that uh in 2014 at least in my interpretation with um Russia trying to um really reestablish its control over the post Soviet space and Ukraine is was crucial for that for that project and the more globally Russian Vision since 1990s was that they didn't like the American monopolar World they knew and realized that they couldn't go back to the bipolar world of the of the um Cold War era so the the vision was multi-polar World in which again it wasn't just academic exercise it was a political exercise in which Russia would be one of the centers one of the polls on par with China on par with European Union on par with the United States that's that's very broadly speaking the context in which in which the war starts in 20 in 2014 where we are now well we are now in Russia certainly trying to regain its military strength but no one actually believes that Russia is the sort of a superpower it was imagined before 2022 we see certain in Russia uh finding the way to deal with the sanctions but we don't see certain Russia as a as a economic economic power with any sort of a future so it is not an implosion of the of the Russian military economic and political power but it's significantly actually it is diminished so um today very difficult imagine the Russia emerging as another pole of the of the multi-polar world not impossible but it's the war certainly made that that's very problematic and and much more difficult on the other hand what the war did it basically uh awakened the West the old west United States and Western Europe transatlantic Alliance and on the top of that there are East European countries that are uh even much stronger proponents of of assistance for Ukraine than is Germany or or or or the United States of America so it is it is the the replay of the Cold War story The Return of the West that one of the chapters in my book The Russa Ukrainian war is is called that way we also can see the elements of the rebuilding of the beijin Moscow Alliance of the 1950s which was a very important part of the Cold War it was extremely important part of the Korean war that in many ways launched launched also the the Cold War globally so I see a lot of parallels of of going back to the time of the Cold War and the bipolar world that emerges it's not anymore the world focused on Washington and mosco it's more like World focused on on Washington and Beijing and then there were countries in between there are countries in between that that join join one block or another block that is emerging that is not fully fully formed this is this is in my opinion makes the task of of us historians to really go back to the Cold War and look and look for for through New Perspective on on the history of that conflict because there is a lot of things that we can we can learn so so in in some ways history does repeat itself here so now it's a cold war with China and and the United States what's a hopeful trajectory for the 21st century for the rest of it the hopeful trajectory is um really um trying to be as wise and as lucky as as our our predecessors during the Cold War because the the dominant discourse so far about the Cold War was what a horrible thing that cold war was what did we do wrong how did we end up in the Cold War and I think especially today this is a wrong question to ask the right question to ask is how did it happen what did we do so right that for now more than 70 years we don't have a World War how come that after World War I World War II came within 20 years how come that what what helped us to keep the world on the bring but still away from the global war for such a long period of Time how to keep the Cold War cold that's that's the biggest lesson that the history of the C War can give us and I don't think we we ask the question qu often enough ask the question that way and if you don't ask right questions we don't get right answers yeah if you've written a book a great book on the Cuban Missile Crisis we came very close not to Just Another World War but to uh you know a nuclear war and um the destruction of human civilization as we know it so I guess it's a good question to ask uh what do we do so right and maybe one of the answers could be that we just got lucky and and the question is how do how do we keep getting lucky um luck luck is clearly clearly one of the factors in in the in um Cuban Missile Crisis because uh what happened there and the there is one of the lessons is that uh eventually the the commanders at the top they believe that they have all the cards they negotiate with each other they try to to see who who blinks first in in the game of nuclear brinkmanship the trick is that they don't control fully people on the ground the most dangerous moment of one of the most dangerous moment of the Cuban Missile Crisis was the Soviet missile shooting down the American airplane killing the pilot an act of War right so technically we're already in War uh and the the order to shoot the missile was given with Moscow having no clue what was going on the ground Moscow never gave gave approval for that and uh again I described that in book many times about Kennedy bringing back his wisdom from World War II years there there always will be S so B who didn't get the order or or or missed things and and that was happening on the American side as well so uh people who believe that they in control really are not in control and that can escalate uh whether they very often against against their their ises so that is one lesson but going back to what why we're still here and why why the world didn't didn't end up in 1962 is that the leadership and and that's that's I I come to the issue that you strongly believe in that people personalities matter leaders matter uh they were they were very different right uh age education political careers understanding what politics are and so on and so forth you mean k kusov and Kennedy yes but they had one thing in common that in one way they belong to the same generation that was generation of the bikini at all that was the generation of the hydrogen bomb the bomb that unlike the atomic bomb they knew could destroy the world and they were scared they were scared of the nuclear of the nuclear weapons and they tried to do whatever they could pushing against their advisors or or or were trying to deal with their with their anxieties the first is true for Kennedy the the later maybe for kusov to make sure that this that the war between the United States and and and uh the Soviet Union doesn't start because they knew that that war would be would be a nuclear war so we have we have a very very paradoxical sort of situation the crisis occurred because of the nuclear weapons because kosov put them on Cuba but the crisis was resolved and we didn't end in the third world war because of the nuclear weapons because people leaders were afraid of them and that's that's where I want to put emphasis it's not that the nuclear weapons created crisis or solve the crisis it's basically our perception of them and we are now in the age after the Cold War era is the new generation of Voters with the new generation of politicians we don't belong to the generation of bikini at all we maybe know what bikini is but we think that this is a different different thing yeah is something else and it's very it's very important it's it's so fascinating how that Fades into memory that uh the power and and the respect and fear of the power of nuclear weapons just Fades into memory and then we may very well make the same mistakes again yes we can another leader said that I believe but about a totally different topic well uh like you said I'm I'm also glad that we're here uh more as a civilization that we're still seem to be going on there's several billion of us and I'm also glad that the two of us are here I've read a lot of your books I've been recommending it uh please keep writing thank you for talking today this is an honor thank you very much Le it was it was a pleasure thanks for listening to this conversation with sirohi to support this podcast please check out our sponsors in the description and now let me leave you with some words from Ernest Hemingway never think that war no matter how necessary nor how Justified is not a crime thank you for listening and hope to see you next time