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Keyu Jin: China's Economy, Tariffs, Trade, Trump, Communism & Capitalism | Lex Fridman Podcast #477
y3yAVZk3tyA • 2025-08-13
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Kind: captions Language: en The following is a conversation with Ku Jin, an economist at the London School of Economics specializing in China's economy, international macroeconomics, global trade imbalances, and financial policy. She wrote the highly lauded book on China titled The New China Playbook: Beyond Socialism and Capitalism that details China's economic transformation since 1978 to Today. and it dispels a lot of misconceptions about China's economy that people in the west have. This is the Lex Freedman podcast. To support it, please check out our sponsors in the description and consider subscribing to this channel. And now, dear friends, here's Ku Jin. What is the single biggest misconception the West has about China's economy today? The biggest misunderstanding is somehow that a group of people or even just one person runs the entire Chinese economy. It is far from the reality. It is a very complex large economy and even if there is an extreme form of political centralization, the economy is totally decentralized. the role that the local mayors, I call this the mayor economy, plays in reforms, but also driving the technological innovation that we're seeing right now. It is actually not run by just a handful of people. It's more decentralized than the US is. And I think more broadly, a big misunderstanding is really the relationship between Chinese people and authority. >> Can you elaborate on that? >> Well, you know, people think that somehow there's almost blind submission to authority in China. We have a very nuanced relationship uh with authority whether it is you know between kids and parents or um students and their teachers or with your bosses and the Chinese government. It's kind of the same thing. There's paternalism. Uh they think that they're responsible for you. Um but uh deference a certain amount of deference to authority is not blind submission. It's been written implicitly in our contract uh for thousands of years that in exchange for some difference uh we are given stability, security and peace and hopefully prosperity. >> So there is some element that we have in the west of freedom of the individual so that a little bit of the rebel is allowed uh in balance with the difference to authority. >> Yeah, absolutely. Without that, how can you have this radical dynamic entrepreneurism you see in China if you don't have a sense of self, a sense of uh the fact that you can find opportunities, you look for opportunities, you you you drive opportunities. Um it's all self motivated. Is there still a young kid in China that's able to dream to be sort of the the stereotypical Steve Jobs in the garage, start a business and change the world by doing so? >> There are millions of young kids like that in China. They might not be thinking about changing the world and this is where the Chinese approach to innovation is very different from the Silicon Valley one, I'd say. Um, but they see opportunity. They see a country with a billion consumers. They see scale. They see speed. They see that with their dreams and the team that you have in China with engineers and the digital transformation, you can do so many things. And this generation of young people think about transforming their local economy. I I think we're going to get into this, but it's no longer going to just be manufacturing. The young kids are entrepreneurs. >> Well, let's uh stay in the big picture a bit. There's a a perception that China is a uh communist country. So to what degree is China a capitalist country and to what degree is it a communist country? I've rarely seen a more capitalist uh society than China from the pure economic uh uh side. I've rarely seen companies that are as competitive as Chinese companies. uh people as ambitious and obsessed with making money as Chinese people uh kind of ruthless actually uh and look you know consumers shop firms invest if you invest well financially you'll get great returns what is not capitalistic about the Chinese economy at the same time the social fabric is highly socialist first of all the state enterprises dominate in many of the sectors the state banks s control the financial system. Uh we often talk about common prosperity, about equal opportunity, just and fair society. But even, you know, daily stories, a walk in the park behind my my parents apartment, you're going to find at least 50 organized social groups on a daily level, singing, dancing, exercising, doing whatever these fantastic idiosyncratic hobbies they have, getting together every single day. And three courses for the elderly and retired, right? That sense of communalism, that sense of belonging, uh that strive for harmony at the societal level is there. >> So, uh just to go back to something you said, there is a value for competition culturally. So, on the business side, on the economic side, there is sort of a cultural value of people competing in a meritocratic way. Competition is ferocious in China, especially when it comes to Chinese companies, but also in education. I should be thankful that I'm not, you know, born later than I am because I thought China was pretty competitive already, uh, going to the schools and studying for the exams. It is a different level today. Competition is not necessarily in the culture. I'd say it's driven really by the changing economic and social circumstances of the day. The Chinese companies are all hardworking. They're all going after the market share. They all kind of want to do the same thing. You know, it's not quite like in the US where you open a coffee shop. Well, next door I'm going to, you know, open a bagel shop, right? In China, if the coffee shop does well, everybody wants to open the same coffee shop. And I think again, I'm sure we're going to get to this, but there's a lot of that kind of competition, which really drives the world sometimes crazy um of replication, but it's because it's not easy, right? It's not easy to make money in education system. There are not enough jobs for the young people. So how do you get ahead? Uh how as let's say if you're part of a lower stratum society, how are you going to make sure that your children are going to have a better life than you? You invest in education. So everything is about competition in a country with 1.3 billion people. That's uh somewhat to be expected. >> Let's go back to the roots of that. So you described that China's economy model uh is rooted in its history. So can we talk about Confucianism? Can you explain to what degree those roots run back to Confucianism and in general to other parts of Chinese history? >> Yeah, Confucianism is more of a moral philosophy uh than let's say religion or a belief system. It prioritizes um social harmony above anything else. It's not about metaphysics but more about ethics and at the individual level the responsibility the duties are all meant to preserve that social order. So it's felop piety um it is loyalty it is how to be a Chinese gentleman. Um but things like saving frugality is part of the moral discipline. Education is part of the moral cultivation. So there's a very strong emphasis that you as a citizen have a responsibility to contribute to society as a whole. >> On the education side, a part of confusionism is a is a value for meritocracy. So how does that permeate the education system in China? You've already spoken to it a little bit, the value of competition and that it's already getting more and more intense, but it would be very interesting to get your understanding of the education system, its history and as it stands today. >> If China were relatively successful economically, a huge part of the reason is by and large it's been meritocratic. That is changing somewhat now, but the only way that you have still that many poor people, especially a couple decades back, still be in harmony with society, seeing all these rich people, you know, make tons of money and you're still belonging to that lower stratum. The only reason is that you believe that your children have a future through meritocracy. And even though it's imperfect, it's highly imperfect. standardized testing, all this competition, all of the the the hours and the tutorials to studying for standardized exams. Well, that is a very realistic um scenario in China because there that many people, you know, when I was growing up in school, we had 60 people per class and there were 10 classes in one grade. Now, imagine that many people applying for colleges uh in the in the American way. how many essays would have been written and need to be scrutinized. Also that gives room for total corruption if you you know if you know what I mean just connection based and actually the standardized exams as imperfect as it is to select talent is still by and large fair and um that's how that whole generation of you know entrepreneurs but bureaucrats government officials were selected if you look at the Chinese premers uh the presidents of the past they they all went to great schools you know a lot of them were engineers years and uh same thing for civil servants. It has changed somewhat. You know, the meritocracy I think is is eroding in China. I'm worried about that because it is fine that you get into a good university based on your own merit, but finding a job now becomes much less meritocratic. People with connections get jobs more easily than than others. Of course, this is not just a unique Chinese phenomena. It's actually everywhere. But I guess what I'm saying is that that meritocracy which was so fundamental to the Chinese ancient Chinese education system by the way civil servants were selected based on standardized exams in the past that's always been throughout Chinese history and that relates to Confucianism. Now the opportunities and coming back to the competition point is that the opportunities getting slimmer and slimmer and again this is not a unique Chinese phenomenon. Jobs where are the jobs going to be right? So, um, meritocracy has become more of a problem. >> Uh, do you have any memories of your own experience in terms of competition, the good and the bad of it? Maybe, uh, from that, can you, uh, pull out the thread of of the value of that kind of competition? Basically, you know, uh, I grew up in the Soviet Union, so there's a kind of brutality to the competition. Um, but I think it ultimately molds really interesting people. >> There is a good and bad part of competition. And I remember when I was going into middle school, every single midterm exam, final exam, you were ranked from number one to number 800 in your entire grade and publicly displayed. >> Nice. >> Nice. Right. >> Um, imagine, you know, the majority of people and how they feel. >> Um, but it it does drive ambition in part and you don't take anything for granted. uh and you work hard, you keep, you know, you keep the spirit up. But, you know, going to the US, I finally realize that Americans are totally competitive. It's just that they don't display it. It's not as apparent. I I remember I go I went to a very competitive high school, but everyone's like so chill. Oh, I'm not studying. Oh, you know, they're they're studying. They are secretly studying. Um when I was doing my PhD at Harvard, people say, "Oh, you know, my parents say don't work too hard." You know, people say, "Don't say you worked." They're working hard, right? Just you don't show it. In China, it's it's kind of um a noble thing to show that you're working hard and that you're number one or that you're top of the class and you want to display it. You want to let everybody know. But in the US, everybody's like secretly doing it. >> Yeah. Some of it is the is the signaling the culture emphasizes the signaling of is it better to be kind of for everything to come easily thereby showing that you're a genius it comes naturally or is it better to show that you worked extremely hard for the thing but the ultimate result is there's still competition but I don't know when you're visually displaying and uh explicitly stating that it's good to be number one and it's bad to be number 800. I think that permeates throughout the culture to where >> you understand uh first of all you understand that hard work is the only way to uh improve to to to succeed in life and second of all you just create this framework of uh early on understanding what it means to live a good life. And a part of that is to uh to find the thing you're damn good at and get even better at it, master it, become hopefully the best person in the world at that thing. I don't know. That's a extremely important lesson for society teach. >> That's the right I would say the right kind of competition or the efficient kind of competition. I feel that in the Chinese education system it was not necessarily efficient because it kind of frames you and molds you to be thinking in a certain way uh what's been taught to you. You don't have the bandwidth or the time or creativ freedom to be more creative and to think outside the box. There it's just the box. You maximize the box and that's it. You don't actually know what's outside of the box and you never actually go there. That's the bad part of Chinese competition. And when I got to the US, uh, the high school teachers were asking us to question authority, to question text. I'm like, wow, really? You can do that? So, I started asking why. >> All right. So, there there has been this miracle in the Chinese economy from um after Mao under uh Deng Xiaoing where the Chinese economy got transformed and grew incredibly. So can you explain what happened the different transformations that happened uh the different reforms that happened under Deng Xiao Ping? >> Dang Xiao Ping was by far our most pragmatic leader and I think everybody is grateful to Deng Xiaoing. My father's generation would not have seen that amount of prosperity and peace and opportunity without Deng Xiaoing. Uh it started in the late 1970s when Dung Xiaoing came out with this open up and reform mandate and it was very tough. Again coming back to the big misunderstanding of China. It's not as if one leader decides that that's what we're going to do and then everybody follows order and does that. No, there are tons of political barriers, tons of incentive compatibility problems at the local level. In the end, you need the local provincial governors, the mayors to do the job. And how many perfeurers are there in China, right? A lot. And um they have their own interests, right? We we know this around the world. Politically is the most difficult thing to do. Um but somehow Dung Xiaoing was able to break tradition, break convention, um come up with this completely new way of thinking about society, life and economy. And it was so transformative. I remember people of that generation told me one time that you know society was going to focus on the economy. Really? Why would they do that? Wasn't it politics? Wasn't it everything about politics and struggle and ideology? So for them that the whole country and the government is going to focus on the economy was just so shocking uh even though we take it for granted now that that that shows you that breaking that that mold was incredibly difficult. Um but um I think opening up was a really momentous thing that China did and it wasn't just joining the debut. I mean they were doing a decade of work in preparation leading up to that um uh what's called you know special economic zone is really to turn Shenzhen from a fishing village to an export platform now to a Chinese style Silicon Valley right and there was the agricultural reforms in the 1980s that meant that farmers could decide what they were going to grow and keep the surplus whereas it was a collective system before you you know that very well and then of course the ultim Imate transformation was when China actually joined the WTO in 2001 and the rest of was history right we're still talking about the aftermath but reforms was the single biggest impetus to Chinese growth and every time there was a major reform it was followed by a good decade long growth every time growth went down there was a new series of major reforms rolled out and then oops that you know led to another wave of good growth. But I'd say that reform pace has slowed in the last 15 years. But are there reforms to be done? Yeah, absolutely. You know, has China reached even close to its potential? Not at all. Um, but again, it comes back to politics. Right now, it's less about economics. It's more about national security. It's more about politics. And I think that is probably the single biggest barrier to continued good economic growth. >> Baby, can you speak to what it takes in such a large system, in many ways, such a successful economy to do reform? So you mentioned pragmatism. Deng shiping famously said that it doesn't matter whether the cat is black or white as long as it catches mice. So there's that pragmatism. >> Yeah. >> That I think underlies a lot of great reforms. As a contrast to Soviet Union, uh the Chinese economy as I mentioned was extremely decentralized. You know in Soviet Union the ministries were in charge. It was a central bureaucracy but a lot of the power were given to these provincial governors, party secretaries, mayors of different sorts and they were incentivized. That's the key is that these mayors were incentivized to do a good job. If I were successful on a radical reform, if I were successful, I'd be a national hero and then that reform would be rolled out in every single city in in the country over time and I would be promoted to the higher run of the central government and who knows I might even become vice premier, premier president one day. That was how the individual was motivated to carry out these really tough reforms. Now, China has changed a bit, right? It's not about being radical and radically successful. It's being it's about being safe, right? So, when you shift from basically an entrepreneurial state to a safe state, then the objective function changes and you see it in different economic uh outcomes. >> So, maybe can you speak to that? What what are some important things to understand about the structure of the Chinese state? Well, the central leadership politically is extremely powerful and very consolidated, but they hold a very crucial key to the local governments, which is that they decide their fate. Am I going to promote them? Am I going to put them in jail? Am I going to fire them? Am I going to reward them? Am I going to p punish them? They they hold that crucial key. And I think what was you know very surprising for most of the western audience is that when I mentioned about the mayor economy there's a you know why why don't our American mayors in each city do these very radical things and then push for GDP growth and technology and innovation it's quite different I think this is where China's very unique in the world is that political centralization economic decentralization and the yard stick to measure local mayor's competence through in the first stage it was GDP growth. So I am a a mayor of you know the city of Nanjing in Jangu province. I'm going to like peak at my neighbors mayor's uh uh city's GDP growth and I'm going to be very very competitive. By the way I forgot about that competition is extremely competitive among the local government officials because you are competing with other mayor for a top job. Right? So you need to do better than them. And whether that was efficient um structure or not, I cannot comment. But it certainly just fueled this massive and rapid expansion, economic expansion. Uh first it was industrialization. Everybody wanted to do exports. Then they discovered, oh my gosh, we can have so much fiscal revenues coming from land, right? Selling land and real estate. Let's let's let's build real estate and let's urbanize. And then the the money kept coming in to these local governments and that they can spend it on on nurturing more companies or supporting real estate or supporting investment and they can do a better job. So then it was geared towards real estate and that's how the property cycle became the big thing. Everything was at double speed because of what the local government's incentives um were designed to do. I I I say now that China's biggest challenge is consumption, right? It's not production. We know that China is very very competitive in production and supply. China needs to be a consuming country to be a rich country. Why don't you put consumption as part of the yard stick for measuring local governments? You know, for a while is environmental protection. Guess what? Very few of them will really want to do it seriously because it goes against the uh incentives of driving growth, right? They would suffer on GDP growth if they were very serious about environmental protection. So for a couple years nothing happened in China on that front and then the central government got really kind of concerned and even angry and frustrated. So they decide to put that as a penalizing uh factor and then guess what happened? Well actually environmental protection um sped up and you know in the matter of short short few years I see blue skies every day in Beijing. That's how it works. >> So GDP is a measure of success in production. What's uh the measure or what does it mean to be successful on the consumer side? You said it's important to improve that. What does it mean to be a successful consumer nation? >> The metrics shouldn't be geared just towards growth alone. GDP growth alone. It was just singular GDP growth and you can borrow uh heavily and just spend on infrastructure. That's not a productive way to drive the economy. That's what the local governments were doing for a long period of time. You know, in the last few years, innovation unicorns have kind of been an implicit yard stick for local governments. That's kind of how we've seen these great, you know, EV companies, 80 cities doing EVs. I mean, do we really need 80 cities to do their own EVs, right? Solar panels, now Deepseek has become, you know, a star. uh semiconductor companies, you know, each local government wants to have their own national champion. So implicitly technology was part of the yard stick competition as well. But if you can more accurately have a metric for consumption measures really focus on you know making sure that it's coming from consumption this GDP growth rather than from investment or infrastructure then I think that it might focus the government's objective a bit more on uh thinking about how to make people feel more secure uh so that they want to save more for instance creating more jobs for instance more on social security spending on health care uh on elderly care uh because for the longest period of time this political economy model was brilliant at scaling up supply but it was extremely weak at raising personal consumption because the incentive does not lie in consumption it lies in production. So you shift the objectives a little bit and maybe local government will do more to stimulate consumption. >> Okay. You mentioned uh the mayor economy. That seems like an incredibly powerful idea. And you also mentioned that perhaps uh you're not sure exactly how perfectly efficient it is and what efficiency there means. How good are you at quickly figuring out the best ideas? That's what an efficient market does. There's a kind of component to what you're saying where you're a little bit critical of do you really need 80 EV companies? But maybe you do. It seems like an incredible thing to do, right? So, what are the pros and cons of this? Maybe you can speak to it a little bit more. >> I think it depends on the timing. If you're starting something, starting a new emerging strategic sector like EVs or batteries or solar panels, you need the local governments to be involved to mobilize, right? The big push to coordinate the supply chains. If you wait for the markets to develop over time, it's going to take a long time. Maybe they don't even want to do it, right? Look at the US. the US is very very behind on some of these new strategic sectors. But once you've reached a certain level of market competition, I think the state needs to to withdraw or to retreat because ultimately the state is not the best at allocating resources, picking winners. You want the private actors, whether it's the venture funds or the, you know, through market competition to ultimately decide who gets the most resources. But in the beginning that big push is not not really in any of the canonical models that I've studied in economics in the western school of thought state push state mobilization state initiation that's not there but I think if you look at EVs solar panels even just thinking about the idea of reforms in the first place um that initial state push was vitally important uh the other negative although I think by and large positive positive aspect is I don't think that we need 80 cities to do their own EV brands but to get started maybe that's what it would have taken to drive that incentive and then ultimately it's up to the market to decide who are the last five remaining EV companies right through market mechanisms that's Chinese style industrial policy um industrial policy was heavily criticized and again if I talk to my Harvard professors they will be very very very skeptical about the the role of the state especially in such a major way. But if you look at the Chinese experience, the evidence for success is all there. The the cities that have pushed the most on supporting that particular sector ultimately did the best in terms of production but also in terms of innovation measured by patents. It's all in the data. Um but the downside is that a lot of the capital is wasted and this is what I also discuss in my book is that it is inefficient although maybe it's necessary uh the amount of waste of investment you know plowed into these uh companies that will ultimately just go under. um but also the misallocation of resources because it's led by the state are some of the downsides. But I guess I guess on balance it's been positive because look at China's internal combustion engine effort nothing right semiconductors thanks to Biden thanks to Trump it's improved dramatically but all these things that they tried to do before they couldn't do but when it's a new thing like something that there's no incumbent no particular advantage in any country actually China is really spearheading these sectors >> can we linger a little bit more on this mayor economy it just seems seems like such a powerful thing where one mayor looks over to the next and looks even just a trivially simple number like the GDP GDP. Why don't we do that in the United States or in the West more? Just compete on GDP. >> Well, you you need to be elected and reelected, right? Is that what your electoral base cares about? Right? In China, it's what the central government, your boss, cares about. If you ask the consumers, they rather you spend on social spending, right? The things we talked about that stimulates consumption, on education, on healthcare, things that stimulate demand. So yeah, >> that's the political it's a difference of political system. >> So maybe can you speak to the difference? Another difference is the longterm multigenerational thinking uh that permeates Chinese culture. So how does that differ from the west sort of the western style capitalism of uh quarterly focused thinking? >> The Chinese are both the most patient and the most short-termist um economic actors I met. The patients I don't need to explain because I think the political continuity means that they can make plans for two decades ahead, right? Even longer. um uh the investment of Chinese parents in their children is a multi-deade long project uh and they they save you know Chinese people love to save because they think that they'll have even more money uh if they save that money rather than spend it on a ski vacation. So that I I think it's patently obvious to uh uh most people around the world. But I think that most of them would not have known that there is a very popular motto in China which is called short flat fast. That's the impatient part of the Chinese culture especially with respect to the economy. Short flat fast was used to describe a winning volleyball strategy that eventually became adapted to describing the society as a whole and economic decision-m. If you're an investor, you only want to invest in things that you can quickly turn around, make a lot of money, and don't need to do much work. Uh it also applies to marriages. So, a short courtship, a very flat emotional relationship, and a fast divorce. Um that that is uh how uh you you see these um companies rise, you know, within a very short period of time. of course investors are only interested in those companies that can turn around and exit in a very short period of time making many many multiples and um so in that sense people are very very impatient right I I sit on some boards of these long-standing companies and the values are just so different uh even though a lot of these public companies are constrained by the quarterly results and so forth but the values are about sustaining ing something a company for a long time thinking about organic growth thinking about investments for the future sustainability um maybe it's that competition maybe it's the speed that we're used to in China people think about short um so you know this dichconomy is very very interesting >> that's surprising to me >> yeah well >> it's a surprising idea right so that >> there is a kind of uh in the west conception of Chinese culture Chinese economy that everything is you say 50 100 200 years out you have this long vision but you're basically saying that there's a deep uh in the business sector uh impatience about everything >> that's it's a transitory phenomena I'd say but if you look at the cheaper stuff poor quality that's a reflection of that the coping it's the same kind of mentality just get ahead quickly but again that is all shifting that is all shifting because China is now in a different stage of development. If you ask the younger generation, they really care about quality. They care about values. Uh and these companies, these very successful companies, successful in 5 years, 10 years, found themselves in a very difficult position after a longer period of time. So that short flat fast attitude which was so popular especially before the pandemic, that's actually somewhat disappearing. So in some sense this economic downturn is not that bad for China because it make it made the Chinese realize that it's not always going to go up and uh it made them really look down deeper into what they really should be focused on. Uh that there will be cycles, there will be up and downs and so these very shorttermist thinking and opportunistic way of driving business will ultimately fail. Um it is it's bad for China that we're having a sustained economic uh uh softness sustained economic softness but I think it's also a very very important lesson for the Chinese people to go through. >> Let's go if we can a bit to the personal. So you grew up in China. What are some moments from childhood that were maybe defining to your understanding of Chinese culture and Chinese economy? You know, we look back at those moments when everybody in China was very poor with a bit of nostalgia. I remember um no doors were locked. I was I was in Beijing and I remember every day in the summer, everybody just went downstairs and chatted with everybody else. >> Um uh it was very social. It was very community- based. Uh the neighbors help each other. uh we had very very little uh small apartments, very limited access to certain goods. When I was born, there were even in Beijing there were there were you know these these vouchers for how many eggs you can buy and even Beijing there were three or four blackouts per week typically. There was a sense of community. There was a very strong bond between people and within the family because they were going after a common goal, making your life better, right? struggling, striving to make your life better. And I remember being on the back of my father's bike, uh, getting up, you know, 6:00 a.m. every day and going to nursery and, you know, that's that's the typical day. Uh, not a lot of material goods, but people had a sense of purpose and, uh, that's radically a different uh, it's completely different now in China. Do you think that if you go to the human condition, do you think that that nostalgia has some truth to it or is it just nostalgia like any other? Is there some aspect of a intense, competitive, vibrant economy that loses some element? >> Absolutely. >> Of everybody being poor together. >> Well, everybody having a common goal and a sense of community, right? That that is what's missing in these extremely individual-based capitalist societies. And I think what the Chinese government is striving to do with Chinese socialistic characteristics is to somehow try to preserve a bit of that socialist character while still relying on markets, market-based incentives. But if you're an extremely individual-based society, I think you do you do lose a lot of that. And I think some of the backlash that we're are seeing uh from society is a reflection of that, right? people being alone more and more uh the the death of despair in the in the US uh the addiction you know that um it's they're lonely right and competition means that you kind of have to be somewhat badass and uh you sometimes put down values and you forsake harmony in order to get ahead that's certainly the Chinese society now that was not the case before >> you think that's a natural consequence of uh of capitalism almost always that you become more individualized, you become lonier, you feel lesser if you're not winning and thereby uh somehow that breaks down society community more and more. >> I think it's a spectrum, right? And uh Europe is somewhere in between, I'd say. Uh but Europe also is not as technologically and innovative as the US. But on a social level, there is more social protection for the people. There is a stronger sense of community. I I'd argue it's not perfect. Ultimately, it is a choice. And this is what I think that China has to decide, right? Do you want technological supremacy and radical breakthroughs? Well, yes. If you do, then you have to tolerate that there are going to be some people who are going to be just going to be um uncomfortably rich, right? like in the United States, you can't say that you detest the financial system for its greed uh but then not accept the fact that it is what fuels innovation, right? Um risky capital fuels uh uh uncertain investments which allows for countries like the United States to be making these breakthroughs. That's what China wants. But at the same time, China can't tolerate these extremely rich people around and the power that they is acrewed to them. They want to to be a leader in technology. But then the financial system is not liberalized. Uh it's highly uh regulated, but you know there's also intervention. Even if we look back at the French civil law versus the English uh common law, well the former protects uh creditors and the latter is more friendly towards debtors which gives them more breathing space to innovate but also to fail and to innovate again. Uh and that makes a big difference. So it's all about a spectrum, right? But you can't have it both ways. We don't often enough have that nationwide conversation about what we want to be as a country. There's just a group of people yelling we don't want billionaires and another group saying we don't want communists or whatever. It's a very trivialized kind of chanting. But there is a balance. There's a spectrum and you get to decide uh do you like the nice things, the nice toys >> and the power that the US has >> and the power, the geopolitical power, the military power, cultural power, influence on the rest of the world. Yeah, you get to choose which which do you want? Um so the first time you went to US, what was that like? Mentioned Harvard. How did that change your understanding of the world? Um, well, it's funny that we're talking about this now because I was able to go to the US on a scholarship to an American high school because the US at that time want was open arms, all open arms towards international students. They kind of wanted to be the the country that was going to educate the future leaders of the world and their elitist in institutions like Harvard was really going to be, you know, they're the center of the world. So they welcomed students like me and many many others uh to be exchange students to study in the US. Um and we thought, "Wow, we've never seen a more generous country." Um, and I was able to uh go to high school, an American high school and live with an American family, which was, wow, can I say a big change uh from from China, not only because I was plucked from the Communist Youth League uh party and then straight to supporting their Democratic campaign because the host family was running for state attorney general in New York. So, I was kind of >> going to these conventions and handing out flyers and trying to get votes and I don't know in China Chinatown or something. But, um, but it was it was so interesting to see that's how the system worked. Um, but in the course of doing that, I realized that people had a very simplistic understanding about China. And that's probably um even when I was 14, I decided that one thing I wanted to do was to dispel some of these deep myths about China because the China that they knew and again it was all the three T's back in the late 1990s, Taiwan, Tibet, and Tamman Square. That's that's they thought about China. They thought about these three things. And I was like, well, that's strange because that's not how I'm feeling in China with all this, you know, bidding for the Olympics before 2000 and all these buildings going up and down, all this excitement about, you know, joining the WTO, all these radical reforms that are that are that are taking place and then all this effervescence that you feel in the air. You it's not GDP growth as numbers, you actually see it. I said this is really, you know, and they're describing China as if it was a place shredded with white terror. And so I thought this that's interesting. Uh there's a big gap big gap of understanding. And even today, that many years later, um people know China a little bit more, but the sentiment hasn't profoundly changed. >> It's still the three T's. I feel like >> some variation of that. Uh so what what about the level of misunderstanding of Chinese people of the west? Is there a similar level of misunderstanding the other direction as well? >> I don't think to the same extent because there's Hollywood uh that you can see daily American life although it might not be totally realistic. Um there was a huge amount of admiration of US um technology innovation but also the American dream. Uh, I think our newspapers, even though there's bias everywhere, is not focused only on reporting the really bad stuff and portraying a negative side. I think these few years have been a little bit different, but so many students went to the US, right? Um, so many people travel to the US and this is the interesting thing. I've rarely met an American who has been to China and who still goes on about how bad China is. I think that going to China makes all the difference. >> I feel that's like one of the big gaps of my life that I need to uh alleviate is to travel in a real way for a long time to really experience the people and the cultures. And China is a big place. >> Go dig deep and don't just go to Beijing and Shanghai. Um let's go back to the economics. So can you just uh dig a little deeper on the relationship in China between the government and the companies in the private sector? So how much freedom do companies have? >> Another big misunderstanding and a fundamental one is that people somehow think that the state suppresses the private sector. It's not at all as simple as that. Um, for the most part, if we look at the local government's incentive system, they want to help the best private companies, which are the most promising because it makes them look good. It adds to their GDP. It adds to the jobs, investment. They are so helpful to these private companies. Actually, I I I know many of these local government officials working tirelessly day and night, especially in bad times uh to coordinate between debtors and creditors and to kind of smooth out and define relationships with banks. They want to help these private companies because again their incentives are aligned. Uh Deepseek is private company by the way. So it has done the country proud and why would the state want to go and suppress these private companies which ultimately is kind of a beacon represents a beacon of success for China. Um, now on how much freedom they have, it's really ranged from too much freedom. That's part of the problem where you have defense companies buying art auction houses, real estate companies like Everrand, buying soccer clubs, doing EVs, uh, uh, uh, companies uh, uh, investing in real estate that has nothing to do with their core business. That's how much latitude were given to private companies. And there were consequences. uh they were not reigned in. And then you go to the other extremes where they're scolded, they're reprimanded, they're reigned in, and they're kind of folded into submission. So that that is the whole spectrum. You have the whole range. But I guess what we're really getting at is it is a country that is moving from a no rule of law or very little rule of law, very immature markets to something that is being gradually um uh uh uh established bankruptcy laws, you know, corruption laws, uh rules and regulations on what's possible. uh one interesting point is that uh in China you you ask the companies to innovate first and then you re regulate after right >> so that has led to things like P2P platforms that you know it's led to lots of kind of financial innovations some of which has actually been very helpful and good some of which have been disastrous but the intention to regulate after the fact is to really not um slow down or hinder the innovation. This is a very different approach from Europe. You regulate first and then you know companies have to work around that. Um so the this is why Chinese economy is so complex. Uh you cannot reduce it to simply a statement saying the state is unhelpful for the private or or something like that. Um there are certain sectors where the suees dominate right when it comes to national security in terms of energy. But let's not focus on these few sectors. By and large, most of the economy, if you actually admit to the fact that China is highly innovative and highly entrepreneurial, means that it must be the private sector that is driving the show. >> Innovate first, regulate after. Really interesting. Uh I also in my mind am contrasting it with the way the Soviet Union and Russia since operated. That doesn't sound at all like this model. And it's interesting that countries that at least on the surface had a similar cultural communist problems. You know, the bureaucracies that form inside the communist state. It just seems that um China broke away from that somehow that don't understand exactly what happened >> in the west. They group these economies together as if they're the same thing. No, it's not the same at all. There's so many differences, uh so much more flexibility. You can have dynamic entrepreneuralism at the same time have socialist characteristics. And I think this is what China has been able to shape and mold a unique model that balances between government industry, between state coordination and market mechanisms and between individualism and communalism. It's not necessarily black and white. You can have all these things at the same time. >> So what are the pros and cons of being an entrepreneur in China versus the west? Like if you get a choice, you have a dream, you want to build epic things, what and you get to choose where to start that business. What are the pros and cons of each path? >> In China, the speed is just all inspiring. You have a good idea, you implement it, you realize your dream very fast because there's also the support system, right? The infrastructure there, the digital infrastructure there, the engineers are there, the talent is there, and they're cheap. And the market competition is there to keep to keep you going. And the consumers give you a very very fast feedback. You know, look at Xiaomi. It was making phones and now it makes one of the world's best EVs. 270,000 cars sold in one day a few days ago with a new model. They were phone makers. >> So, there's an advantage to that. Okay. But I would not feel safe. um not because of danger of expropriation or nothing like that but the bank bankruptcy laws are not there right it's not necessarily always fair competition things don't happen necessarily in orderly manner if you have a competitor you can have a very evil competitor and evil competitors are there everywhere in China they would you know call the police on you put you in jail uh spread false rumors about you maybe that happens also in the US but there's a different it's a different level uh in China. Um, and also the mold that you can have to protect yourself, the IP protection, right? That's much weaker in China because the legal system is not very effective. You have a good idea, you'll be copied. And there's a lot of work. You have to you have to dine and wine with the local governments. I mean, that's not allowed anymore, by the way. But you dine and wine, you know, figuratively speaking, you have to have a very good relationship with them. That's a different kind of work. the wine and dine and the evil competitors is an interesting challenge that in some maybe distant ways akin to the problems of the Soviet Union. I think I guess in the United States there's less of that and I don't even know if that's based on laws cuz there's a lot of lawyers in the US that could do the same kind of evil competitor stuff technically. >> That's true. the potential negative um ramifications are there. But I I I think personal protection is a big difference. If you make a mistake, if you your company is not run well, you know, you go to jail. I think that the US is much much more tolerant on entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs on failure. Since we're talking about it, there was a lot of controversy around Jack Ma disappearing, quote unquote, and uh reappearing a bit later, and there's been sort of rumors of some tense relationships that he has with the Chinese government. What is important to understand about the whole situation? Like to what degree is it reflective of the issues entrepreneurs face in China? In the US, capital controls politics. One could argue. In China, it has to be the other way around. Capital must be reigned in by politics. As part of the capitalist class, do not have the ambition to exceed the powers of the political class is really at the core of it. I'd say the biggest difference between US and China. Um there are important details that I think the west has not fully provided to the public. Um for instance and financial as innovative as it was um was doing banking jobs without being regulated like a bank. Right? So that obviously poses a host of financial stability questions and um and rules and regulations and so forth. So the fact that IPO was halted uh you could say that there were strong economic regulatory grounds uh for that. But I think more broadly speaking if you're an entrepreneur part of the capitalist class keep your head down make money and that's fine right? uh do some philanthropy. There are also many many other billionaires that are just fine that are actually very much in favor uh of the political leadership and um they do their thing. Now I'm not saying what's right, what's wrong. It's just a very very different culture and different country. In the US it's great to be colorful. I mean you have a very very colorful president. He would never have been able to make it in China. uh you have the likes of Elon Musk. It's great to be different. It's great to stand out. You do not want to stand out in China. So the moral of the story is that the top leadership understands that it needs these top entrepreneurs, the likes of Jackmaw, and um they have done so many great things for the country, even for the world. But in China, garnering too much influence and power even through social media uh doesn't make you look that great. It's not a good thing for you personally. And and there's a saying in China that you just don't want to be the tallest tree, right? The tallest tree gets the most wind. So I don't agree at all with the western conclusion that this anecdote, this story has meant that entrepreneurs don't want to be entrepreneurs anymore. The young kids don't aspire to be people like Jackal. That's not true at all. The incentives are still there. It's a different kind of rich elite class in China. >> So on on what dimensions do you think that the height of the tree is measured? Uh, is it is it more about just mouththing off in public? So, can you still be the riches
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